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ABSTRACT
The main rationale for policy intervention in debt renegotiation is to enhance such activity when
foreclosures are perceived to be inefficiently high. We examine the ability of the government to
influence debt renegotiation by empirically evaluating the effects of the 2009 Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) that provided intermediaries (servicers) with sizeable financial
incentives to renegotiate mortgages. A difference-in-difference strategy that exploits variation in
program eligibility criteria reveals that the program generated an overall increase in the intensity of
renegotiations while adversely affecting the effectiveness of renegotiations performed outside the
program. Renegotiations induced by the program resulted in a modest reduction in the rate of
foreclosures and reached just one-third of its targeted 3 to 4 million indebted households. This
shortfall is in large part due to low renegotiation intensity of a few large servicers that responded at
half the rate than others. The muted response of these servicers—which is also observed before the
program—does not reflect differences in contract, borrower, or regional characteristics of mortgages
across servicers. Instead, it reflects servicer-specific factors that appear to be related to their
preexisting organizational capabilities. We exploit regional variation in the share of loans serviced by
intermediaries with high pre-program renegotiation activity to assess the economic effects in areas
more exposed to the program. Regions where HAMP was used intensively saw a lower rate of house
price decline as well as an increase in the pay-down rate on consumer debt. There was no change in
non-durable and durable consumption in these regions, suggesting that distressed borrowers who are
in the process of debt deleveraging may have a relatively low spending multiplier from moderate
debt reduction. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for debt relief programs in
general and for other policy responses to crises that also require intermediaries for implementation.
JEL: E60, E65, G18, G21, H3
Keywords: Government intervention, Debt renegotiation, Mortgage modification, Foreclosures,
Housing crisis, HAMP, Servicers
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I. Introduction
At least since the Great Depression, federal and state governments have regularly intervened in
the functioning of mortgage markets—through household debt relief and foreclosure prevention
polices—during times of exceptionally harsh economic circumstances (e.g., Rucker and Alston
1987). There has been a long-standing debate among economists on the effects of such
interventions. On the one hand, proponents argue that such policies prevent excessive
foreclosures that may not only lead to deadweight losses for borrowers and lenders, especially if
debt contracts are incomplete (Bolton and Rosenthal 2002), but also generate negative
externalities for the society (Campbell et al. 2010; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011; Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales 2011). Moreover, these policies also help reduce high levels of debt that may
distort household consumption and investment decisions (Mian and Sufi 2012). On the other
hand, critics argue that such policies potentially generate moral hazard problems that are likely to
raise the cost of credit in the long run, and may also have undesirable redistributional
consequences (Becker 2009; Posner 2009). Remarkably, despite the economic importance of and
controversy surrounding such interventions, empirical evidence on the consequences of such
policy programs is scant.1 This paper attempts to fill this gap by empirically evaluating the
effects of the largest government intervention concerning mortgage debt renegotiation in the
aftermath of the recent crisis.
We exploit unique micro data concerning the policy program that provided intermediaries
(servicers) who handle distressed loans with sizeable financial incentives to renegotiate
residential mortgages. Employing a difference-in-difference strategy, we estimate that the impact
of this program will fall significantly short of its target. We show that low renegotiation activity
of a few large servicers, which is also observed before the program and seems to be related to
their preexisting organizational capabilities, explains a large part of this shortfall. We use
regional variation in the share of loans serviced by intermediaries with high pre-program
renegotiation activity to assess economic effects in areas more exposed to the program. Regions
where the program was used most intensively saw a lower rate of house price decline and an
increase in the pay-down rate on consumer debt while experiencing no change in non-durable
and durable consumption. These findings have implications for debt relief programs in general
and for other policy responses to crisis that require private intermediaries for implementation.
We study the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a large-scale government effort
that was unveiled in early 2009 in response to the foreclosure crisis. The program provided
substantial financial incentives2 to servicers, relative to their regular compensation, in an attempt
1

This is in contrast to large literature that examines the role of fiscal stimulus in stimulating economic activity (e.g.,
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006; Mian and Sufi 2010; Christiano et al. 2009; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
2011; Parker 2011; Parker et al. 2011; Ramey 2011; and Nakamura and Steinsson 2012).
2
HAMP committed to one-time incentive payments to servicers of $1,000 for each completed renegotiation under
the program. Servicers were also eligible for up to $1,000 in annual, ongoing pay-for-success incentive payments
that would accrue if mortgage payments were made on time for three years after the renegotiation. These incentive

to alleviate several perceived barriers to renegotiation—such as the inability of the private
market to internalize negative externalities imposed by foreclosures (e.g., Campbell et al., 2010)
and the frictions induced by non-agency securitization (e.g., Piskorski et al., 2010).
Our paper has two objectives. First, we undertake a detailed evaluation exercise to assess the
impact of the program by examining how HAMP affected various margins related to
renegotiation decision by servicers, studying both the renegotiations done under the program as
well as those outside it. Moreover, we exploit the variation induced by program exposure—
which potentially facilitated contract renegotiation in some regions, while leaving contracts
relatively unaffected in others—to examine the impact of HAMP on broader outcomes such as
house prices, consumption, and delinquency rates on non-mortgage debt in areas more exposed
to the program. This helps us to generate systematic evidence on the effects of this intervention,
with implications for debt relief programs in general, making ours the first paper to go beyond
the typical anecdote-based discussions of such programs.3 Second, we document and exploit the
significant heterogeneity in program response across intermediaries. This allows us to understand
their role in implementing the program and generate implications for other policy responses to
crises that also require intermediaries for implementation.
We use the unique MortgageMetrics data set from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC). This data set contains precise information on performance and renegotiation outcomes
for more than 60% of outstanding residential mortgages in the United States, and it is a loanlevel panel that has detailed information on loan, property, and borrower characteristics (e.g.,
interest rates, location of the property, credit scores), payment history (e.g., delinquent or not),
renegotiation actions taken (e.g., principal reduction), whether the renegotiation was undertaken
under HAMP, as well as the servicer responsible for the mortgage. The richness of this data set
provides us a unique opportunity to assess the effects of the program.
The biggest obstacle, however, in evaluating the impact of the program on mortgage
renegotiation rates is getting an estimate of the counterfactual level of renegotiation rates for
these mortgages in the absence of the program. We circumvent this issue by using an empirical
design that exploits variation in exposure of similar borrowers to the program. We follow two
strategies to classify borrowers into treatment and control groups. The main empirical strategy
exploits variation in owner-occupancy status and uses the notion that borrowers whose properties
are classified as investor-owned during program implementation are ineligible for HAMP.
Therefore, we use such borrowers as a control group for the eligible group of borrowers whose
property is classified as owner-occupied (treatment group). The second strategy, employed for
payments are sizeable relative to the regular annual fees for servicing, which amount to about twenty to fifty basis
points of the outstanding loan balance (~$400 to $1,000 per year for a $200,000 outstanding loan balance mortgage).
See Section II.C for more discussion.
3
Anecdote-based discussions on HAMP are aplenty. For instance, in July 2010, Neil Barofsky, special inspector
general for the TARP, argued that HAMP had been perceived to be an outright failure. However, Christina Romer,
former chair, CEA, argued around the same time that though a bit slow, the program was making steady progress.
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robustness, uses the notion that among borrowers with properties that are owner-occupied during
program implementation, mortgages with outstanding balances above $729,750 are ineligible for
HAMP. We use such borrowers to construct the control group for the eligible group of borrowers
with loan balances just below $729,750 (treatment group).4
We start our analysis by showing that, on average, control and treatment groups in both
empirical strategies are similar on most observables before the program. In addition, the
treatment and control groups of loans have no differential pre-trends. This holds for various
observables such as credit score, loan-to-value ratio, interest rates, delinquency rates as well as
rate of renegotiations offered in the two groups before the program. As a validation of our
empirical design, we also verify that our classification of loans into treatment group based on the
program guidelines corresponds to the loans where we observe modifications performed under
HAMP. Notably, the second empirical strategy exploits program eligibility criteria based on loan
amount within the group of loans for owner-occupied properties, thereby addressing the
potential criticism of the first empirical strategy that the treatment and control loans might differ
on unobservables because they differ on owner-occupancy status.
Next, we focus on analyzing the extensive margin—that is, additional loan renegotiations
(contract modifications) induced by the program. Doing so requires taking into account the
potential of the program to crowd out modifications performed by the servicers outside of the
program (i.e., “private modifications”). We find that there were non-negligible HAMP
modifications offered in the eligible group of loans, but no evidence of decline in the rate of
private modifications in the eligible group relative to the control group. The potential crowding
out of some private modification activity by the program in the treatment group appears to be
compensated by an overall increase in applicants due to outreach initiatives of the program, with
some of borrowers who did not qualify for permanent HAMP modification receiving a private
modification instead.
We next analyze the intensive margin in the treatment group—that is, in the composition of types
of renegotiations and their effectiveness, as measured by default rate subsequent to the
modification. We provide evidence suggesting that servicers did channel some loans that they
would have modified based on their private incentives to be modified under HAMP instead. In
particular, private permanent modifications offered in the treatment group after the program is
introduced become less aggressive (e.g., fewer rate reduction and interest capitalizations) and
suffer a drop in their effectiveness. These patterns are observed concurrently with an increase in
aggressiveness and effectiveness of modifications done under the program. The drop in
4

Our data consists of loans serviced by large institutions and, in general, includes loans of better credit quality than
typical investor loans used to finance speculative investments in the non-agency market. As a result, in our sample,
the treatment and control groups formed based on owner-occupancy status are very comparable. The second strategy
is even better on this front since both groups of loans consist of similar sized owner-occupied properties.
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effectiveness of private modifications is offset by higher effectiveness of HAMP modifications,
resulting in no change in the average effectiveness of modifications in the treatment group.
Overall, when considering all the renegotiations—regardless of whether they were done privately
or under HAMP—we find that the program led to an increase in the annual rate of permanent
modifications of about 0.7%.5 At this rate, the program would induce about 1.2 million
additional permanent modifications over its duration (i.e., through December 2012)—falling
significantly short of its goal of three to four million modifications for the severely indebted
households targeted by the intervention.
We address various alternatives that might bias our findings. In particular, we investigate if our
treatment effects are inflated because servicers may use up some of their resources for
conducting HAMP modifications in the treatment group at the expense of modifications in the
control group, given the program incentives. We investigate, among others, trends in the control
group for servicers in our sample around the time of program implementation. We further
compare these trends with those exhibited by loans that would have been included in the control
group had their servicers chosen to participate in HAMP. The analysis yields a consistent
picture: servicers modified more loans in the treatment group—with the more promising
candidates for modifications channeled under HAMP to take advantage of program incentive
payments—leaving modifications in the control group relatively unchanged. We further discuss
servicing technology that may lead to such effects.
We then turn to examining the impact of HAMP on the outcome it was designed to ultimately
affect—that is, the rate at which loans are foreclosed. We find that HAMP resulted in a moderate
decrease in the rate of completed foreclosures in the treatment group, reflecting the change in
extensive margin induced by the program. In particular, we observe a differential 0.48% decrease
in the annual foreclosure rate across the loans in the treatment group. This rate would translate
into about 800,000 fewer foreclosures in the treatment group over the original duration of the
program (i.e., through December 2012)—substantially lower than the program target. In
addition, limited coverage of the post-program period in our data makes it difficult to conclude
how many of these foreclosures would be permanently prevented.
In sum, the first part of our paper establishes that servicers responded to the program by
conducting more modifications among eligible loans, although the increase fell significantly
short of the target of this intervention. Moreover, there was an adverse impact on the
effectiveness of renegotiations performed outside the program. While it is difficult to know what
the optimal response to the program incentives should have been, in the second part of the paper

5

The program also induced several trial modifications—renegotiations that had to be necessarily offered under the
program for a trial period before permanent ones could be offered. The rate of trial HAMP modifications is higher
than permanent ones, and only 38% of trial modifications were converted into permanent ones. This conversion rate
reflects several criteria that had to be satisfied before a trial modification could be made permanent.
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we exploit response across intermediaries to shed light on potential barriers to program
implementation as well as on broader economic effects in areas most exposed to the program.
We find substantial heterogeneity across servicers in terms of their response to HAMP, with a
few large servicers offering modifications at half the rate of others. A simple counterfactual
computation shows that this is a large effect—the program would have induced about 70% more
permanent modifications if all the loans by less active servicers were renegotiated at the same
rate as those of their more active counterparts. Further investigation shows that the renegotiation
activity of servicers during the program closely tracks their pre-program renegotiation behavior.
While contract, borrower, and regional characteristics of mortgages are important determinants
of renegotiation activity of a servicer, these differential patterns of renegotiation across servicers
cannot be accounted for by these factors. Instead, servicer-specific factors—which seem to be
related to their preexisting organizational capabilities—are responsible for differences in preprogram renegotiation activity across servicers. Servicers with lower (higher) renegotiation
activity had pre-program organizational design that was less (more) conducive to conducting
renegotiations on dimensions such as size and workload of the servicing staff, staff training
effort, and servicing call-center capability.6
Finally, we explore the impact of the program on regional outcome variables such as house
prices, consumption, and delinquency rates on other categories of consumer debt. The broad goal
of this exercise is to help understand the effect of debt relief programs such as HAMP, when
implemented intensively, on economic outcomes. To do so, we exploit regional variation in the
share of loans serviced by intermediaries with high pre-program renegotiation activity to assess
the economic effects in areas more exposed to the program. Because servicer concentration in a
region is determined prior to the program and is very persistent over time in the data, using this
variation to examine effects of HAMP in areas most exposed to the program seems reasonable.
Consistent with our earlier evidence, regions with high concentration of loans serviced by active
servicers in the pre-program period were more likely to experience a significant amount of
program modifications. Importantly, these regions saw a lower rate of house price decline as well
as an increase in the pay-down rate on consumer debt, relative to similar regions with low
program exposure. There was no concurrent relative change in non-durable consumption (such
as groceries) or durable consumption (auto sales) in regions with higher exposure to the program.
Our findings suggest that debt relief programs, when used with sufficient intensity, may have a
meaningful impact on foreclosure rates and house prices, similar to inferences made in Campbell
et al. (2010) and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011). Moreover, our results also suggest that such
6

The fact that some servicers—with similar loans as servicers with low program response rate—actively conducted
modifications under the program suggests that the incentive structure of HAMP may not have been inadequate per
se. Rather, the policy may have failed to account for firm-level factors that resulted in muted program response of
some servicers. Our analysis does not allow us to comment on the exact nature of these firm-level factors or how
they led to inertia in the behavior of these servicers. For instance, servicers with low renegotiation activity in the
pre-program period may not have responded to the program because doing so would have involved changing their
business focus from processing and channeling payments to actively renegotiating loans. In addition, this may have
involved significantly altering their organizational capabilities, such as building infrastructure and appropriate staff.
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programs targeted at distressed borrowers may not necessarily result in a sizeable increase in
non-durable or durable consumption, at least in the near term. Thus, the results in our paper
clarify that distressed borrowers who are in the process of debt deleveraging may initially have a
relatively low spending multiplier from moderate mortgage debt reduction, and use additional
resources to pay down their other debt instead. These findings are consistent with arguments and
empirical evidence in Mian, Sufi, and Rao (2011) and corroborates their view that large
accumulation of household debt prior to the crisis is an important factor adversely affecting
household consumption.
Our paper is related to the small body of empirical literature that evaluates the impact of
government intervention in distressed debt markets. This literature, among others, examines the
federal and state government interventions during the Great Depression through debt moratoria
of farm mortgages (Alston 1983, 1984; Rucker and Alston 1987) and impact on debtor value
generated by the devaluation of debt contracts (Kroszner 1998).
Our work also relates to the literature on the housing crisis (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2009; Mayer et
al. 2009; Gyourko et al., 2009, Keys et al. 2010, 2011; Rajan et al. 2010; and Demyanyk and
Van Hemert 2011, Gyourko and Fernando 2011). In this area, our findings on the impact of
government intervention in mortgage renegotiation are closely related to the work that examines
loan renegotiation in mortgage markets (see Agarwal et al. 2011; Piskorski et al. 2010) and work
that studies the effects of mortgage modification programs on household behavior (e.g., Mayer et
al. 2011). It is also related to the studies evaluating the impact of foreclosures, falling house
prices, and high levels of debt on economic outcomes (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2010; Melzer 2010;
Mian et al. 2011; Campbell et al. 2011; and Mian and Sufi 2012).7
Finally, our findings investigating the possibility of crowding-out of private activity by
government intervention in the context of mortgage renegotiation broadly relate to the literature
on government spending and Ricardian equivalence (e.g., Barro 1989; Johnson, Parker, and
Souleles 2006; Agarwal et al. 2007; Mian and Sufi 2010; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2011;
Parker 2011; Parker et al. 2011; Ramey 2011; and Nakamura and Steinsson 2012).
II. HAMP: Background, Eligibility, Incentive Plan, and Overall Budget
II.A Background
The housing crisis unfolded around 2007, with the number of foreclosures reaching
unprecedented levels. More than 700,000 foreclosures were started in 2007, with another two
million in 2008 and even more in subsequent years (see Credit Suisse Foreclosure Update 2010).
Foreclosures are considered costly—either because they result in significant deadweight losses
for borrowers and lenders or because they result in negative externalities for the society (see
7

See also recent models by Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), Favilukis et al. (2010), Burnside el al. (2011), Philippon
and Midrigan (2011), and Landvoigt et al. (2012) on origins and consequences of housing boom and busts.
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Posner and Zingales 2009 and Campbell et al. 2011). Thus, federal and state government efforts
were aimed at encouraging mortgage renegotiations through loan modifications instead of
foreclosing loans.
There were several reasons why the rate of mortgage modifications was perceived to be low.
First, since foreclosures may exert significant negative externalities, it could be socially optimal
to modify mortgage contracts to a greater extent than servicers were choosing to do privately.8
Second, policy makers noted that the non-agency securitized market—that is, securitized
mortgages issued without a guarantee from government-sponsored entities (GSEs)—accounted
for more than half of the foreclosure starts, despite their relatively small market share. The worry
was that high foreclosure rates on these securitized mortgages reflected factors other than their
greater inherent credit risk. In particular, a servicer—an intermediary who makes the crucial
decision to pursue a foreclosure or renegotiate a delinquent mortgage—is an agent who acts on
behalf of the investor in case of a securitized loan. Thus, servicers’ contractual incentives and
legal uncertainty on the course of action allowed by investors could have inhibited renegotiation
of securitized loans.9
These economic arguments prompted the federal government to intervene in the mortgage
market by providing financial incentives to lenders to renegotiate residential mortgages. On
February 19, 2009, President Obama announced the Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP), which became a central policy tool aimed at bolstering the rate of modifications of
residential loans. The program guidelines were presented on March 4, 2009.
II.B Borrower Eligibility
According to HAMP guidelines, borrowers’ eligibility during the program was based on a
number of factors. First, the property had to be owner-occupied and the borrower’s primary
residence. Vacant and investor-owned properties were excluded. Second, the property had to be a
single-family (one- to four-unit) property, with a maximum unpaid principal balance on the
unmodified first-lien mortgage equal to or less than $729,750 for a one-unit property. Third, the
loans had to have been originated on or before January 1, 2009. Fourth, the first-lien mortgage
payment had to be more than 31% of the homeowner’s gross monthly income in order for the
program to reduce the household monthly debt burden to a target of 31%. Finally, the program
rules require the servicers to offer a trial modification first, which may be subsequently
converted into a permanent modification only if the modification is successful during the trial

8

In times of adverse economic conditions, renegotiating some mortgages instead of foreclosing them could create
value for both borrowers and lenders (Bolton and Rosenthal 2002; Piskorski and Tchistyi 2011).
9
Moreover, coordination frictions between multiple investors of securitized debt can make it hard to change the
contracts between them and the servicers. Existing research has been consistent with the view that securitization
adversely impacted incentives to renegotiate mortgages (Piskorski et al. 2010 and Agarwal et al. 2011).
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period (i.e., borrowers make payments per the changed contract that was offered on a trial basis,
which typically takes about six months).
In our empirical analysis, we use some of these eligibility criteria to classify borrowers into those
who are likely to be affected by HAMP (treatment group) and those who do not qualify (control
group).10 We note that verification of these criteria requires servicers to employ appropriate
infrastructure and sufficiently trained staff. For instance, processing applications for program
modifications involves direct contact between servicer and borrower, potentially through a call
center, in order to collect relevant information.
II.C Incentives for Servicers
We now discuss the incentive payments for the servicers and lenders who participate in the
HAMP program. In discussing these payments, we focus primarily on the first-lien modification
program, which has been the largest component of HAMP, and will be the focus of our analysis.
The major feature of the first-lien modification program is its incentive payment structure. The
funds from the program were to provide one-time and ongoing “pay-for-success” incentives to
loan servicers, mortgage holders/investors, and borrowers. First, there were to be one-time
incentive payments to servicers of $1,000 for each completed permanent modification under
HAMP. Second, servicers were also eligible for up to $1,000 in annual, ongoing pay-for-success
incentive payments that would accrue when monthly mortgage payments were made on time for
three years after the borrower’s monthly mortgage payment was permanently modified. In
addition, servicers would receive an additional current borrower bonus incentive payment of
$500 when a loan was permanently modified for a borrower whose loan was current. As noted
earlier, these incentive payments are quite substantial relative to the regular fees for servicing,
which amount to about twenty to fifty basis points of the outstanding loan balance per year
(roughly $400 to $1,000 per year for a mortgage with $200,000 of outstanding loan balance; see
Barclays 2008 Global Securitization Annual).
Mortgage holders/investors would also receive this type of incentive as a one-time payment of
$1,500 for each modification agreement executed with a borrower who was current on mortgage
payments upon entering HAMP. Finally, borrowers who remained current on their mortgage
payments would be eligible for up to $1,000 in annual, ongoing “pay-for-performance”
incentives for five years—to be used to pay down the mortgage principal. There was also a costsharing arrangement with mortgage investors for help in reducing first-lien mortgage payments.
10

In addition, servicers were required to screen candidates for loan modification to ensure that these borrowers were
in danger of imminent default. Subsequent to such a determination, an NPV (net present value) test was required on
each loan that was in imminent default or was sixty-plus days delinquent under the Mortgage Bankers Association
(MBA) delinquency calculation. This test compares the NPV of cash flows expected from a modification to the net
present value of cash flows expected in the absence of modification. If the payments after modification are greater,
the NPV test result is deemed positive, warranting a modification under HAMP.
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We note that while the servicer participation in the program was voluntary, many major bank
servicers in the United States decided to participate. This includes all the servicers in our main
data set. However, as we corroborated in conversations with the economists at the U.S.
Department of Treasury, some servicers of non-agency securitized mortgages associated with
RMBS deals issued by foreign underwriters opted out of the program. We use an alternative
dataset consisting of renegotiations conducted by such servicers to better assess renegotiation
activity in the absence of the program.
At the time of its introduction, the program was to remain in force until December 31, 2012.
Program payments were to be made for up to five years after the date of entry into a Home
Affordable Modification. According to the Government Accounting Office (2009), the overall
funds allocated to HAMP were $75 billion. The expectation of policy makers—given the number
of severely indebted households—was that about three to four million homeowners would
receive assistance with their mortgages during forty-five months of the program.11
III. Data
Our main data source for the analysis is the OCC Mortgage Metrics data. This unique data set
includes origination and servicing information for U.S. mortgage servicers owned by large banks
supervised by the OCC. The data consist of monthly observations of over 34 million mortgages
totaling $6 trillion, which make up about 64% of U.S. residential mortgages. About 11% of these
loans are bank-held, and 89% are sold to investors through GSEs as well as through the private
market. Because of various restrictions implied by our empirical design and the availability of
relevant loan characteristics in the data, we end up using about 20.8 million of these loans in our
analysis.12 We study loans over the period July 2008 through December 2010. Since HAMP was
implemented in March 2009, we have data that span nine months in the period before HAMP
was implemented and twenty-one months of the program period.
The origination details in the data set are similar to those found in other loan-level data (e.g.,
First CoreLogic LoanPerformance or LPS data). In particular, there is information on original
loan terms as well as mortgage, property, and borrower characteristics (e.g., credit score, owneroccupancy, balance, and interest rate). The servicing information is collected monthly and
includes details about actual payments, loan status, and changes in loan terms.
The data set contains detailed information about the workout resolution for borrowers. We know
if the loan was modified under HAMP—either as a trial or permanent modification—or if it was
11

This estimate was based on the number of homeowners who were likely to be at risk of default (over 10 million
homes), to have unaffordable loans (more than 8 million homes), to apply for a loan modification (5.5 million
homes), and to pass the NPV test (about 4 million homes). See U.S. GAO Report, July 2009.
12
The reason for this attrition is due to the missing values for loan characteristics in the data, mainly their owneroccupancy status. As will become clear, this field is needed to classify the loans into treatment and control groups.
We will discuss later why, despite this attrition, we think our sample is reasonably representative of the population.
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privately modified by servicers. The data set contains information about the change in contract
terms when a modification occurs (e.g., reduction in interest rate, amount of principal deferred or
forgiven etc.), and the repayment history before and after the action (current, delinquent, etc.). It
also provides information on the identity of the sixteen main servicing entities responsible for the
mortgage. This allows us to exploit within-servicer variation as well as variation across servicers.
We also use a loan-level data set provided by BlackBox Logic that covers almost all securitized
mortgages issued without government guarantees. In addition to origination and payment data
for each of these loans, this data set also reports whether a mortgage received a private
modification in a given month. By merging this data with underwriter data provided by ABSNet,
we are able to separately analyze private modification rates for loans in deals handled by
servicers who opted out of the program. As we will discuss later, this analysis will help
investigate the modification trends among servicers who did not participate in the program.
Finally, in our zip-code-level analysis, we use zip-level house price indices from CoreLogic, ziplevel auto sales growth data from Mian and Sufi (2010), zip-level data on non-durable spending
growth from Nielsen data at Chicago Booth (Kilts Center) and data on consumer credit
performance from a credit bureau (Equifax).
IV. Empirical Methodology
IV.A Research Design
The biggest obstacle in evaluating the impact of the program on outcome variables is to get an
estimate of the counterfactual level in the absence of the program. We circumvent this obstacle
by exploiting variation in exposure of similar borrowers to HAMP. The key to our empirical
design is defining the groups of borrowers that are eligible for HAMP. The main empirical
strategy (called Strategy 1) exploits variation in owner-occupancy criteria for receiving
renegotiation under HAMP to form these groups. Specifically, we argue that borrowers whose
properties are classified as investor-owned during program implementation are ineligible for
HAMP and, therefore, can serve as a control group for the treatment group—namely, the group
of borrowers whose properties are classified as owner-occupied.
We investigate the validity of this assertion in the data and find support for it when we evaluate
various borrower and contractual observables.13 In particular, we show that there are no
differential trends in how the treatment group compares with the control group before the
program is passed (see Meyer 1995). The identification assumption is that in the absence of
13

Our data consists of loans serviced by main banking institutions and, in general, includes mortgages of much
better average credit quality than typical loans that were used to finance speculative investments in the non-agency
securitized markets. As we will show, this makes the treatment and control groups formed based on owneroccupancy status very comparable in our data (see Haughwout et al. 2011, who show differences between owneroccupied and investor loans when they investigate the sample of largely non-agency securitized mortgages).
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HAMP, the difference between treatment and control groups would display similar payment and
renegotiation patterns (up to a constant difference) during the period of the program as they did
before it. We provide evidence on the validity of this assumption in Sections IV.B and Section
VI.
We rely on the following difference-in-difference specification to estimate the effect of HAMP:

Yit      Ti    Ti *1 After it  X it   it ,
where T takes a value of 1 for loans in the treatment group and 0 for the loans in the control
group. After takes the value of 1 for the quarters after 2009:Q1 (the program period), and 0
otherwise. Loans for owner-occupied properties take a value of T=1, while the investor-occupied
loans take a value of T=0. The occupancy status of these properties is based on information
gathered at origination of the loan. In addition, we require that loans in the treatment group have
an outstanding balance below the program eligibility cutoff of $729,750. The coefficient 
measures the effect of the program on the treatment group relative to the control group, while the
coefficient  measures the pre-program differences between the treatment and control groups.
We estimate these regressions on all mortgages. The reason is that the only requirement of
HAMP is that borrowers must “face economic hardship and a danger of imminent default.” The
program guidelines do not have any specific requirement that a loan has to be delinquent or
under water to be eligible. In fact, the program provides additional financial incentives to
servicers to actively modify loans that are currently making payments (but may not do so in the
future). Nevertheless, one could potentially also conduct the analysis only on delinquent loans,
arguing that borrowers with these loans are those most likely to satisfy these criteria. While our
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper, we are cautious in following this
route. The reason is that, as discussed in Section V.C.2, delinquency status of a loan may itself
be a response variable to HAMP—since the program design may itself induce borrowers who
would otherwise continue making payments to default (see Mayer et al. 2011).
The first outcome variable employed in these regressions is to assess the extensive margin—that
is, whether or not the loan was modified (i.e., Yit=1 if loan i was modified in time t). We use
several variants of this variable, such as whether the loan was privately modified or was
modified under HAMP. To ensure that we track the rate of modifications on loans rather than the
cumulative effect, we drop loan observations subsequent to the modification when we use a loan
in a panel setting. In our regressions, we account for different loan-level attributes that capture
observable idiosyncratic differences across borrowers. In particular, Xit is a vector of loan and
borrower characteristics that includes variables such as initial FICO credit score, initial and
current loan-to-value ratio (LTV), and initial interest rate and loan balance. We also include
controls for loan ownership status: whether a loan is securitized into GSE-backed pools (agency
11

loan), is securitized without government guarantees (private-label loan), or is bank held
(portfolio loan). In addition, we also employ origination year and servicer fixed effects to absorb
any aggregate effects driven by the times at which loans were originated and to capture
idiosyncratic servicer-related effects.
In our subsequent specifications, we also investigate the intensive margin—that is, we employ
similar regressions to evaluate the likelihood of receiving different types of contractual
modifications conditional on receiving one (i.e., Yit=1 if loan i was modified in time t and the
modification was of a certain type). Similar regressions are also employed to assess the
efficiency of renegotiations by tracking the likelihood of redefault of a loan subsequent to
receiving a modification (i.e., Yit=1 if loan i was modified in time t and the loan redefaulted
within a certain time period from t) and the likelihood a loan is foreclosed (i.e., Yit=1 if loan i
was foreclosed in time t).
Finally, we note that in our main specifications that investigate change in renegotiation rate, the
loans that default (e.g., become seriously delinquent) do not exit the estimation sample. Only
when these loans are foreclosed do they exit the estimation sample. We include these loans since
delinquent mortgages could be considered as plausible candidates for renegotiation. Similarly, in
specifications that investigate the change in foreclosure rate, loans that are renegotiated do not
exit the estimation sample. Again, these loans are included since they may be plausible
candidates for getting foreclosed. In Section VI.C we discuss the robustness of our findings with
respect to these choices.
IV.B Potential Concerns
We confront several challenges in the identification of our key estimates. First, we need to show
that the treatment and control groups are comparable before the program was implemented.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for important observables at the quarterly frequency in
the treatment and control groups as defined by our empirical strategy. It reports the statistics in
the pre-HAMP period—that is, from July 2008 to March 2009.
As one can observe, the control group is very similar to the treatment group on most observables.
In particular, the control group has loans that have, on average, a slightly higher FICO credit
score relative to the treatment group (717 versus 710). The mean LTV is about 70%, and about
1.7% of loans are seriously delinquent (payments that are at least two months past due) in both
groups. Moreover, interest rate, a statistic that captures the overall riskiness of the borrower pool
in the two groups, is very similar across the two groups (the mean for both is slightly above 6%).
The renegotiation rates in the two groups differ a bit in the pre-HAMP period—about 0.3% of
loans obtain private permanent modifications per quarter in the control group and about 0.4% in
the treatment group--but, importantly for our identification, as we will show in Figure 3(b), there
are no pre-trends in this difference. It is worth noting that not only the means but the computed
12

standard deviations of the two groups are quite similar for all these variables as well. These
patterns are also visible in Figure 1. In particular, in Panels 1(a)–(c), we plot the kernel densities
of FICO credit score, LTV, and interest rates for the borrowers in the treatment and control
groups defined based on owner-occupancy status. The borrowers in treatment and control groups
look remarkably similar on all these dimensions.
The observables in the treatment and control groups are not only well matched across time in the
pre-treatment period, but they are also matched period by period (Figures 2(a)–2(d)). For
instance, Figure 2(d) plots the evolution of the monthly delinquency rate of treatment and control
group in the pre-program period and illustrates that these rates track each other very closely up to
a constant difference (we revert to more formal tests of this assertion in Section VI.C). Similarly,
Figure 3(b) confirms that the renegotiation rates in the two groups follow similar pattern in the
period before the program.
In general, one might be worried that borrowers in our treatment and control groups may differ
significantly. However, our data consist of mortgages serviced by main banking institutions,
which are known to be on average of a better quality than the entire population of U.S.
mortgages (see Piskorski et al. 2010). This could explain why loans in the control group
(investor-owned properties) are well matched with those in the treatment group (owner-occupied
properties) in our data. Nevertheless, we provide evidence for robustness of our results by using
an alternative empirical strategy in Section VI.A that allays these concerns—both treatment and
control groups in this strategy consist of owner-occupied properties with similar observables. We
also conduct several other robustness tests to deal with related concerns in Section VI.
Second, like other studies on program evaluation that use the difference-in-difference strategy
(e.g., Mian and Sufi 2010), we will not be able to comment on any economy-wide effects
introduced by the program. For instance, we will not be able to detect any across-the-board
improvement or worsening in renegotiation process and standards due to the program because
such effects will be differenced out.
V. Impact of HAMP: Loan-Level Analysis
V.A Impact on Extensive Margin: HAMP and Private Modifications
V.A.1 HAMP Trial and Permanent Modifications
We start our analysis by discussing the renegotiations induced by the program in the treatment
group. We first focus on renegotiations that are offered in the form of “trial modifications,” and
may be subsequently converted into “permanent modifications” if the modification is successful
during the trial period (i.e., borrowers make payments according to the changed contract that was
offered on a trial basis).
13

In Figure 3(a), we present the fraction of loans that enter trial and permanent HAMP
modifications for the first time in a given month in the treatment group as defined by our main
empirical strategy. There is a substantial increase in HAMP trial modifications in the treatment
group just after the introduction of the program in March 2009. As shown in Figure 3(a), the rate
of HAMP trial modifications peaks around late 2009 and then starts to decline. We note that the
sharp decline in the number of HAMP trial modifications in the second half of 2010 was likely
related to the tightening of program eligibility rules for such modifications. Prior to June 1, 2010,
trial modifications could be initiated even if borrowers did not provide all required
documentation to potentially roll them over into permanent modifications. Borrowers had to
submit the required documentation in order to enter the trial modification subsequent to this date.
(See Supplemental Directive 10-01 of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.)
As we observe from Figure 3(a), on average, about 0.144% of loans enter a HAMP trial
modification in a month in the treatment group (with the peak being around 0.35% per month).
This translates into a 1.74% annual modification rate. This rate implies that, during our sample
period, about 522,000 loans received a trial HAMP modification in the treatment group.
In Figure 3(a), we also present the fraction of loans that enter permanent HAMP modifications
for the first time in a given month in the treatment group. In our sample, a permanent HAMP
modification resulted, on average, about 20% reduction in monthly payment--a saving of $350
per month. There is a substantial increase in HAMP permanent modifications, starting a few
months after the program was introduced in March 2009. This pattern is mechanical because, as
we discussed earlier, a loan could be given a permanent HAMP modification only subsequent to
a successfully completed trial HAMP modification, which usually took at least three months. On
average, about 0.055% of loans per month received a permanent HAMP modification in the
treatment group (with a peak of about 0.14% per month). This translates into about a 0.66%
annual modification rate. This rate implies that during our sample period, about 200,000 loans
received a permanent HAMP modification in the treatment group. We note that, as a validation
of our empirical design, we verify that our classification of loans into the treatment group based
on the program guidelines corresponds to the loans where we observe modifications performed
under HAMP.14
It is also worth noting that using these estimates we can get a sense of the “conversion rate” from
trial modifications to permanent ones. In particular, our findings suggest that about 38% of
HAMP trial modifications were converted into permanent ones. The rate is smaller than 100%
because the program guidelines require the conversion from trial to permanent HAMP
14

There are a few program modifications that we observe in the control group. These cases are relatively rare and,
importantly, excluding or including them does not impact our inferences. Conversations with servicers suggest that
these cases reflect program guidelines that allow for modifications under the program to be offered to borrowers
that, at the time of applying for a modification, could credibly show that the property was now their main residence.
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modification to be based on several criteria. These include the borrower making the scheduled
payments under the terms of the trial modification, as well as the borrower providing the
necessary documentation that helps servicers to verify borrowers' eligibility for the program. We
summarize these findings in Table 1, where we present the average quarterly rates of trial and
permanent HAMP modifications in the treatment group based on owner-occupancy status.
Next, we further explore the characteristics of mortgages that were more likely to receive a
modification under HAMP. To do so, we assess how the likelihood of receiving a trial or a
permanent modification under the program relates to observables on a given loan in the treatment
group. Columns (1)–(2) of Table 2 present the estimates from specifications that employ a
dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if a given loan in the treatment group (defined by
Strategy 1) received a trial HAMP modification during the program period (2009:Q2 to
2010:Q4) and is 0 otherwise.15 Columns (3)–(4) present the corresponding results for permanent
HAMP modifications.
As we observe, mortgages given to borrowers with lower FICO credit score, higher loan-to-value
ratios, higher interest rates, and higher loan amounts, as well as lower documentation level, are
more likely to receive both trial and permanent HAMP modifications. These results are not
surprising given that the program targeted loans at risk of default, and these characteristics are
broadly indicative of the higher risk of default.16
Overall, these results indicate that HAMP induced a sizeable number of modifications in the
eligible group of loans. However, this does not necessarily mean that the program increased the
overall rate of modifications performed by the servicers, as it may also have affected the
modifications outside of the program (that is, private modifications). We formally investigate
this question in the next section.
V.A.2 Private Permanent and Overall Modifications
We now explore the effects of HAMP on renegotiations done by servicers based on their private
incentives outside the program (private modifications). In Table 3, we test whether HAMP
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Throughout the paper we estimate our specifications using the OLS despite the binary nature of several of the
dependent variables. The reason is that we have a large number of fixed effects along several dimensions, and using
logit or probit results in an incidental parameters problem. Our OLS specification with flexible controls to capture
nonlinearity allows us to estimate our coefficients consistently even with multiple fixed effects (Dinardo and
Johnston 1996). Regardless, we have verified that we obtain qualitatively similar inferences when employing logit
specification without employing as many fixed effects.
16
We also investigate the relation between incidence of HAMP modification received by a loan and its ownership—
i.e., whether loan is securitized into GSE-backed pools (agency loans), is securitized without government guarantees
(private-label loans), or is bank-held loans (portfolio loans). We find significant number of HAMP modifications
(both trial and permanent) in all ownership categories. These results, along with those in Section V.A.2, suggest that,
consistent with one of its objectives, HAMP did enhance modification activity on securitized loans.
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affected the rate of permanent private modifications in the treatment group.17 We focus on
permanent private modifications, since these renegotiations have been shown to be the main
renegotiation tool for loss mitigation in the period before the program (Agarwal et al. 2011). As
described in the section discussing our empirical strategy, the impact of HAMP on private
modification rates in the treatment group relative to the control group can be identified by the
coefficient on T*After. The coefficient estimates in Columns (1)–(3) suggest that the rate of
private permanent modifications in the treatment group slightly increased relative to the control
group after the program’s introduction (0.014% to 0.020% on a quarterly basis). This would
translate into between 17,000 and 24,100 extra private permanent mortgage modifications in the
treatment group during our sample period. This evidence suggests that the program did not result
in a decline in the rate of private modifications in the treatment group.18
We also observe these patterns in Figure 3(b), where we present the fraction of loans that enter
permanent private modification for the first time in any given month in the control and treatment
groups. Private permanent modification rates in the two groups display similar patterns before
the introduction of HAMP in March 2009. This is consistent with earlier evidence that showed
that treatment and control groups are comparable in the pre-treatment period, further validating
our empirical design. The numbers in the figure suggest, on average, that the quarterly private
modification rates range from 0.3% to 1.8% (60,000–180,000 modifications per quarter). As
discussed, there is an increase of 0.014% to 0.020% in the quarterly private permanent
modification rate in the loans in the treatment group during the program. In addition, the
program resulted in an absolute increase of 0.165% in the quarterly permanent modification rate
in the treatment group because of the permanent HAMP modifications (Table 1). Taken together,
these estimates suggest that HAMP led to an increase in the annual modification rate of about
0.72%. This amounts to about a 40% increase relative to the pre-program mean modification rate
in the treatment group.
We confirm these findings in Figure 3(c), which presents the combined (private and HAMP)
permanent modification rates in treatment and control—and more formally in Column (4) of
Table 3, where we estimate the overall impact of the program on the rate of permanent
modifications (private and HAMP). At this rate, the program would induce about 1.2 million
additional permanent modifications over its original duration (i.e., through December 2012)—
significantly short of the government expectations of three to four million modifications.19
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Throughout the paper we cluster standard errors at the state level corresponding to the location of the property
backing the loan. The results are also robust to clustering at the loan level.
18
The fact that there is no adverse impact of the program on the rate of private modifications may seem surprising.
However, we do find significant evidence that the program adversely impacted the aggressiveness and effectiveness
of renegotiations performed outside the program (Section V. B).
19
We arrive at 1.2 million additional permanent modifications induced by the program, assuming that our estimates
are valid for the entire stock of 45 million potentially eligible loans for the program in the U.S. This involves
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These findings are robust to performing inferences separately among agency and non-agency
loans (i.e., among loans issued with or without guarantees of government-sponsored entities such
as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac). Panel B of Table 3 shows these results. As we observe, there is
no decline in private permanent modifications in the treatment group in either category of loans.
Moreover, the program resulted in a similar increase in the overall rate of permanent
modifications in the treatment group for agency and non-agency loans (0.13% and 0.15%
increases in the quarterly permanent modification rate, respectively). Similar inferences hold
when we further split non-agency loans into privately securitized and bank-held loans. These
results suggest that the program resulted in an overall increase in the permanent modification rate
regardless of the loan ownership categories (i.e., whether a loan is bank held, is privately
securitized, or is securitized with government guarantees).
At a first glance, the finding of no decline in the intensity of private modifications in the
treatment group during the program period may appear surprising. However, note that the
program could broadly affect the rate of private renegotiations in two ways. First, in the presence
of government incentives, lenders may substitute some of the private modifications with HAMP
ones. This crowding-out of private activity with government subsidized one would lead to a
decline in the rate of private renegotiations in the treatment group. However, there may be a
second countervailing force, which could potentially blunt the first effect. In particular, the
program, through its outreach effort, could increase the pool of borrowers in the treatment group
who apply for modifications. Consequently--to the extent that some of the additional applicants
who did not receive a HAMP modification could end up getting a private one--the program could
also positively impact the intensity of private modifications in the treatment group.
The evidence in the data is consistent with the second force outweighing the first effect. In
particular, we find that more than a third of borrowers who applied for a HAMP modification in
the treatment group--and received a trial HAMP modification that did not become permanent –
subsequently received a permanent private modification. Since attracting and evaluating
potential borrowers for a modification is costly, it may be profitable for servicers to offer a
private modification to some applicants who, upon evaluation, did not qualify for a permanent
HAMP modification. As HAMP triggered an increase in borrower solicitation through its
outreach effort, it also expanded the pool of applicants who did not qualify for the program.
Once the costs of attracting and evaluating these borrowers--a significant component that
determines profitability of a modification--became sunk, it may have been profitable to offer

applying the same estimate for potentially eligible loans that are not covered in our data and projecting the same rate
from the end of our sample period until the end of the program period. Notably, our estimated number of HAMP
modifications is very close to the actual program modifications released by the administration in 2013. This fact
lends credibility to representativeness of our sample.
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private modifications to some of them.20 While the presence of the second effect masks the
potential substitution on extensive margin, we next provide evidence that servicers did channel
some loans that they would have modified privately through HAMP instead.21
V.B Impact on Intensive Margin: Contract Terms and Redefault Rates
In this section we evaluate the changes on the intensive margin—that is, on the type and
effectiveness of modification offered, conditional on the loan receiving a modification. In
general, lenders can change more than one dimension of the contract term when they renegotiate
a loan. For example, a lender may offer an interest rate reduction on the loan, as well as writing
down the principal. We focus on the key categories of such changes, evaluating the change in the
rates of these modification types around the program. In addition, we examine the impact of the
program on the rate of default of renegotiated loans (“redefault rate”), a commonly used metric
to evaluate the effectiveness of renegotiations (see Haughwout et al. 2010).
In Panel A of Table 4, we follow a specification similar to the main one, with the analysis
confined to modified loans. In terms of the outcome variable, we are now interested in measuring
the type of contract changes in both HAMP and private modifications after the passage of the
program. Accordingly, the T*After interaction term in the present context captures the change in
the contract terms associated with both private and HAMP permanent modification in the
treatment group relative to the control group. The results in Columns (1)–(4) show that overall
permanent modifications in the treatment group became less aggressive relative to ones in the
control after the program was introduced. In particular, the incidence of more aggressive tools
like rate reduction, term extension, and principal reduction decrease (by about 11%, 9%, and 2%,
respectively), while the incidence of less-aggressive tools, like capitalization of unpaid interest in
the principal amount due, increases (by close to 10%).
To better understand the composition of modification tools, in unreported results we also
separately consider the permanent private modifications and HAMP modifications. We observe
20

Given the program incentives, servicers may have been willing to ex-ante spend resources on borrowers to learn
about their program eligibility even if they know that a sizeable proportion of these borrowers would not qualify for
the program once necessary information had been collected. This investment may have positive expected value for
servicers, with program benefits earned on qualifying borrowers compensating servicers for costs incurred on
evaluating borrowers who would end up failing to qualify for the program.
21
A simple example can illustrate this point. Suppose that in the absence of the program servicers would have
performed 100 private modifications in the pool of loans controlled by them. Subsequent to the program
implementation, and given that the incentive payments under the program are higher if a loan did not redefault after
a modification, the servicers will channel 20 most promising and eligible of these modifications to be performed
under the program. The remaining 80 loans would be modified privately. This is the first crowding out effect.
However, the program through its outreach results in additional 50 borrowers applying for modification. After
spending resources on evaluating these borrowers suppose that only 10 are eligible for HAMP modification. Of the
remaining 40, given that the costs of attracting and evaluating these borrowers--a significant component that
determines profitability of a modification--became sunk, it may have been profitable to offer private modifications
to 20 of them. This is the second effect. Consequently, after the program introduction we end up with 130
modifications of which 30 are program ones and 100 are being done privately. Note that the number of private
modifications does not decline despite the fact that the program resulted in channeling of some the modifications
that would have been conducted privately to be performed under the program.
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that servicers offered more comprehensive modification terms for renegotiations done under
HAMP. There is a significantly higher incidence of rate reductions observed on HAMP
modifications relative to the private permanent modifications in the treatment group (55%
higher). This pattern is consistent with the program requiring participating servicers to make
mortgages more affordable for borrowers with economic hardship and facing imminent default.
The incidence of term extensions and principal write-downs is also higher for HAMP
modifications, but the magnitudes are smaller (27% and 3%, respectively). These results suggest
that although HAMP modifications appear to be more aggressive in terms of concessions offered
to the borrower, concurrently, private permanent modifications performed in the treatment group
became less aggressive after the program’s introduction relative to the control group.
In Panel B of Table 4, we use an indicator of whether or not a modified mortgage redefaults
within six months of renegotiation as the dependent variable. Our specification is similar to the
main one, with the sample confined to modified loans. Note that there is a significant downward
trend in redefault rates for both treatment and control group loans over time. More importantly,
as is evident from Column (2) we find that the program did not affect average redefault rates in
the treatment group relative to the control group.
To better understand these results, in unreported tests we evaluate the change in redefaults
separately for private and HAMP modifications. We find that the redefault rate of HAMPmodified loans is significantly lower, around 5%, than that of private permanent modified loans
in the treatment group. This effect is sizable relative to the mean redefault rate of about 20% for
permanent private modifications in the treatment group in the pre-program period. However, this
increase in efficiency (as measured by the redefault rate) due to HAMP modifications is entirely
offset by concurrent reduction in efficiency on private permanent modifications.
The findings from this section suggest that the program had an effect on the intensive margin. In
particular, we find that subsequent to the program introduction, private modifications done
outside the program in the treatment group became less aggressive in their composition as well
as in their effectiveness relative to the control group. This drop in effectiveness of private
modifications appears to be offset by higher effectiveness of HAMP modifications, resulting in
no change in the average effectiveness of modifications in the treatment group around the
program. This analysis shows that servicers may have channeled more promising loans (on
unobservables) to be modified under the program, since the incentive payments under the
program were higher if a loan did not redefault after a modification. As a result of this
channeling of promising loans to the program, there was an adverse impact of the program on
effectiveness of private modifications in the treatment group.
It is worth noting that these findings do not imply that the program did not have an effect on
other economic outcomes since there was an increase in the overall rate of modifications in the
treatment group (i.e., due to expansion on the extensive margin). We now investigate this aspect.
19

V.C Impact on Foreclosures and Delinquency Rates
V.C.1 Foreclosure Rates
We now turn to examining the impact HAMP had on the outcome it was designed to ultimately
affect—that is, the rate at which loans are foreclosed. In Panel A of Table 5, we assess HAMP’s
effectiveness in preventing foreclosures by examining how the rate at which a loan was
foreclosed in a given quarter varies across the treatment and control groups. As before, the
coefficient of interest in these regressions is T*After.
The results indicate that there was a decrease in the rate of completed foreclosures in the
treatment group during the program period. In particular, among all the loans, we observe a
0.12% decrease in the quarterly foreclosure rate (about 17% lower than the foreclosure rate in the
control group during the program period).22 This would translate into a decrease of 0.48% in the
annual foreclosure rate and about 145,000 fewer foreclosures in the treatment group during our
sample period. This rate would translate into about 800,000 fewer foreclosures in the treatment
group over the original duration of the program (i.e., through December 2012).23 As Column (3)
indicates, the estimated reduction in the foreclosure rate is robust to inclusion of state fixed
effects for the location of the property backing the mortgage.
In the next three columns we conduct an alternative test in which we evaluate the change in
foreclosure rates for delinquent loans instead of using all the loans. Note that as explained
earlier, we prefer to do our analysis on all loans, because delinquency status of a loan is itself an
endogenous variable that could be affected by HAMP (also further discussed in Section V.C.2).
With this caveat in mind, the test does give us an assessment of how foreclosure rates change on
distressed loans. Among delinquent loans we observe about a 2% absolute reduction in the
quarterly foreclosure rate (8% decrease in the annual foreclosure rate). Notably, Column (6)
shows that the estimated reduction in the foreclosure rate among delinquent loans is also robust
to inclusion of the state fixed effects for the location of the property backing the mortgage.
Finally, note that these estimates represent the overall impact of the program on foreclosure rates
during our sample period. Hence, they represent the combined effect of trial and permanent
HAMP modifications, changes in the number and composition of private modifications, and the
program’s impact on other servicing actions and outcomes that may impact foreclosure rates. It
is also worth noting that these estimates are obtained for our sample period ending in December
2010. As a result, we cannot quantify the overall effect of the program on foreclosure rates

22

Alternatively, this estimate represents a 40% relative decrease with respect to the mean foreclosure rate in the
treatment group prior to the program. Note that the relative reduction in foreclosure rate relative to the control group
during the program period is smaller than this estimate because foreclosure rates have been trending upward.
23
We arrive at 800,000 fewer foreclosures induced by the program, assuming that our estimates are valid for the
entire stock of 45 million potentially eligible loans for the program in the United States. This involves applying the
same estimate for potentially eligible loans that are not covered in our data. In addition, we project using the same
rate from the end of our sample period until the end of the program period.
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beyond this horizon. It is possible that the decline in foreclosure rates may be temporary. For
instance, servicers may just be delaying foreclosures while the program is being implemented. In
addition, it is also possible that some of the effects we document may reflect inter-temporal
substitution since some renegotiations that may have been done in the future could have been
pulled into program period by HAMP. Thus, the long-run impact of program on modifications
and foreclosure rates could be even smaller. Nevertheless, we note that even if the reduction in
foreclosure rates due to HAMP was temporary and confined to our sample period, such a
reduction may have some social benefits by spreading the incidence of foreclosures over a longer
horizon (see Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011).
V.C.2 Delinquency Rates
An important concern regarding mortgage modification programs is that they may induce
borrowers who would otherwise continue making payments to default in order to increase their
chances of receiving help (e.g., see the discussion of such behavior in the context of the
Countrywide modification program in Mayer et al. 2011). We now examine whether we find any
evidence that HAMP induced such strategic behavior on the part of borrowers. In particular, we
examine if the program increased the propensity of some borrowers to become delinquent in
order to benefit from reduced debt payments under the program.
We estimate a regression in which the dependent variable is the probability that a loan becomes
60 days past due in a given quarter, conditional upon making payments (being current) two
months earlier. In other words, we estimate the transition rate of a loan moving from being
current to 60 days delinquent. Again, the main focus is on T*After, which estimates the change in
this transition rate in the treatment group relative to the control group in the period after HAMP
was introduced.
As reported in Panel B of Table 5, there is a relative increase in the delinquency rate in the
treatment group in the pre-HAMP period. However, this increase is very small, on the order of
about 0.027% per quarter. This is an increase of just 1.5% in relative terms when compared with
the pre-program mean in the treatment group. These results suggest that the program did not
induce a significant wave of defaults by potentially eligible borrowers relative to those who were
ineligible for the program.
To investigate the timing of these effects further, we re-estimate the specification in Table 6 and
present the results in Internet Appendix (A.1). Here, we replace the After dummy with quarterly
dummies and their interactions with the treatment dummy (the excluded category includes
observations from 2008:Q3). This specification allows us to investigate the quarter-by-quarter
changes in default patterns between the treatment and control groups. As is shown, we again find
no evidence that the program resulted in an increase in defaults in the treatment group relative to
the control one in any quarter during the program period. The estimated differential quarterly
changes in default rates are insignificant and economically small, with the effect ranging at the
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maximum to about 0.15% change in the quarterly default rate in the treatment group (on a base
of 1.60% mean quarterly default rate in the treatment group in the pre-program period).
These results seem sensible and may provide guidance for designing large-scale renegotiation
programs in the future. In particular, HAMP guidelines contained multiple eligibility
requirements that required borrowers to produce documentation of their economic hardship and
danger of imminent default. In addition, there was also an evaluation trial period prior to
permanently changing the contract with the borrower. Moreover, the program provided
additional compensation to servicers for modifying the loans that were current. This suggests that
our findings of limited strategic behavior induced by HAMP may have to do with extensive
screening related to its eligibility criteria and its design of incentives for servicers.24
VI. Extensions and Robustness
VI.A Alternative Identification Strategy
One potential criticism of our empirical strategy is that even though the control and treatment
loans are comparable on observable dimensions, the two sets of loans might still differ on
unobservables because they differ on owner-occupancy status. We now refine our empirical
strategy to provide additional support for the findings derived using treatment and control groups
that are formed based on owner-occupancy status.
This alternative empirical strategy (called Strategy 2) exploits program eligibility criteria based
on loan amount within the group of loans for owner-occupied properties. Specifically, among
borrowers with properties that are owner-occupied during program implementation, those with
mortgages with outstanding balances above $729,750 are ineligible for the program.25 Therefore,
we use these loans to construct the control group to measure the counterfactual level of
renegotiations for mortgages with balances just below $729,750 (treatment group) in the absence
of HAMP.
It is important to note that relative to our main empirical strategy, this alternative strategy is
likely to consist of loans in the control group that match better with those in the treatment group.
The reason is that both groups consist of loans for owner-occupied properties with relatively
similar balances. However, this empirical strategy potentially suffers from low power, because
few mortgages with loan balances in the vicinity of $729,750 face economic hardship and
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These findings are in contrast to strategic behavior induced by simpler modification programs. In particular,
Mayer et al. (2011) show that the simple modification program by Countrywide Financial Corporation led to
significant strategic defaults. Unlike HAMP, the Countrywide modification program did not employ extensive
screening of borrowers. Instead, it relied only on serious delinquency of the borrower as the key eligibility criterion.
25
The $729,750 figure equals the temporarily increased maximum conforming loan eligibility limit for high-cost
areas that was incorporated into the 2008 economic stimulus package. The new jumbo-conforming program was
adopted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, effective April 1, 2008, until December 31, 2010. Because the vast
majority of loans in our sample were originated before April 2008, this loan limit had no particular meaning during
their origination process (e.g., all loans in close range of this limit were not eligible for conforming loan status).
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receive modifications. Regardless, this analysis provides a valuable consistency check for the
results obtained earlier.
Specifically, similar to our main empirical specification, we estimate:

Yit      Ti    Ti *1 After it  X it   it ,
where T takes a value of 1 for loans in the treatment group and 0 for the loans in the control
group. After takes a value of 1 for the quarters after 2009:Q1 and is 0 otherwise. Loans for
owner-occupied properties whose amount outstanding is below $729,750 as of the date of
announcement of the program (March 2009) take a value of T=1, while loans for owneroccupied properties with the balance above this threshold take the value of T=0. To make the
comparisons of loans in the treatment and control groups in the second strategy comparable, we
restrict attention to loans that are within $100,000 of the threshold. As before, we estimate these
regressions on all mortgages and employ the same outcome variables.
Panel A of Table 6 confirms that loans in the control group are very similar to those in the
treatment group in terms of their observable characteristics. These patterns are also visible in
kernel densities of FICO credit score, LTV, and interest rates for the borrowers in the treatment
and control groups defined based on the loan amount threshold (Internet Appendix A.2).
Notably, as before, not only are the observables in the treatment and control groups well matched
across time in the pre-treatment period, but they are also matched period by period (Figure 4(a)–
(d)). For instance, Figure 4(d) plots the evolution of the monthly delinquency rate of treatment
and control group in the pre-program period and illustrates that these rates track each other very
closely (up to a constant difference). Moreover, Figure 5(b) shows that the renegotiation rates in
the two groups follow almost an identical pattern in the period before the program.
In Figure 5(a), we present the fraction of loans that enter the trial and permanent HAMP
modifications for the first time in a given month in the control and treatment groups as defined
by this alternative strategy. The patterns in the plots suggest inferences similar to those obtained
with our main empirical strategy. As was the case with our main empirical strategy, we verify
that our classification of loans into the treatment group based on the program guidelines
corresponds to the loans where we observe modifications performed under HAMP.26
We now discuss salient results from this strategy, presented in Panel B of Table 6. First,
consistent with results in Table 3, we find no evidence that the program resulted in a decline of
the rate of private modifications in the treatment group (Column (1) of Panel B of Table 6). If
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We observe a few rare instances of program modifications in the control group. These modifications are on
mortgages that were classified in the control group based on the loan amount as of program announcement but that
became eligible for HAMP due to a progressive reduction in the loan amount implied by a loan amortization
schedule. Our inferences are similar, regardless of whether these few cases are excluded or included in the analysis.
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anything, there is a small increase in the quarterly rate of permanent private modifications (about
0.06%). Column (2) of Panel B in Table 6 confirms this by estimating the overall impact of the
program on the rate of permanent modifications (private and HAMP together). As we observe,
the quarterly rate of permanent modifications in the treatment group increases by about 0.21%
relative to the control one (about a 30% increase relative to the mean permanent modification
rate in the treatment group). These findings are also visible in Figure 5(c). Overall, these results
are consistent with our previous findings of a significant positive effect of the program on the
extensive margin (the number of permanent modifications).
Second, Column (3) of Panel B of Table 6 presents the results on redefault for the alternative
identification strategy. Consistent with our previous results, we find no change in the overall
efficiency of modifications in the treatment group relative to the control after the program was
implemented.
Finally, Columns (4) and (5) of Panel B of Table 6 present the foreclosure results for the
alternative strategy. Again, we find qualitatively similar evidence as before: the program reduced
the number of foreclosures in the treatment group relative to that of the control group. As we see
from Column (5) among delinquent loans, the estimated decline in the quarterly foreclosure rate
equals 0.59% per quarter—a reduction of 14% relative to the foreclosure rate in the control
group in the program period.
Two comments about this empirical analysis are worth noting. First, the results using this
alternative empirical strategy are qualitatively consistent with those obtained in Sections V.A–
V.B. This is despite the fact that analysis with this strategy suffers from potentially low power.
Second, we note that in our analysis, we classify borrowers as potentially in the treatment or
control group based on their loan status as of program announcement. However, a borrower in
the control group with a loan balance above the $729,750 threshold may strategically become
eligible for HAMP if the borrower pays down the loan’s principal over time. There are several
reasons why this is not likely to be an issue in our analysis. One, we note that few loans in our
data cross the balance threshold in our program period from the control group to the treatment
group. Two, most of these loans appear to cross the threshold because of the mechanical
amortization schedule implied by their mortgage payments before the program announcement.
Three, we classify borrowers as potentially in the treatment or control group based on their loan
status as of the program announcement, allowing us to circumvent the issue of potential
manipulation of loan balance by borrowers to become eligible for the program.
VI.B Potential Bias due to Reallocation
There may be an additional concern that our estimated treatment effects are biased because
servicers may use up some of their resources for conducting HAMP modifications in the
treatment group at the expense of modifications in the control group, given the program
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incentives. This channel, if operational, could inflate the program effect since our estimate in the
treatment group is measured relative to the control group, which would concurrently see lower
modification rates due to reallocation of resources by servicers. In this section we use several
approaches to investigate if there is evidence for this concern.
First, we examine if there are differential trends in the control group around the program
implementation. The thought experiment is that reallocation of resources by servicers from the
control group should change the intensity of modifications in this set of loans after the program
is implemented. We use the baseline regression in Table 3, analyzing the time trend in
modification activity in the control group of loans around the program implementation. Table
A.3 in Internet Appendix presents such a regression. As can be observed, we find no evidence
for this conjecture. The qualitative inferences are similar when we do a quarter-by-quarter
analysis instead (unreported for brevity).
Second, we analyze how modifications in the control group of servicers in our sample evolve
relative to loans that would qualify as control group loans for servicers who did not participate in
HAMP. As explained in Section II, the latter are mainly servicers sponsored by foreign
underwriters. The idea here is that if servicers implementing modifications under HAMP do
reallocate resources from the control group, we should expect a difference in modification
activity after the program implementation between the two sets of servicers. We use the baseline
regression in Table 3, analyzing the modification activity only in the control group of loans. We
explore if there are differences in the modification activity between the two sets of servicers after
the program implementation by including the interaction term After*Foreign, where Foreign is
an indicator variable which takes a value 1 if a loan belongs to deals underwritten by foreign
underwriter whose servicers opted out of the program and 0 otherwise. The results presented in
Table A.4 in the Internet Appendix show that there is no such difference.
Finally, we assess if the treatment effect changes with a higher proportion of treatment group
loans in the portfolio of the servicer. The idea here is that a higher proportion of treatment group
loans might result in greater reallocation of resources by servicers from the control group after
the program is implemented, thereby changing the treatment effect differentially. To explore this
possibility we again employ our baseline specification from Table 3 but also include an
interaction of T with a variable Share, which is the proportion of treatment group loans in the
portfolio of that servicer. The results, presented in Table A.5 in the Internet Appendix, show that
there is no evidence for such a scenario.
Overall, the analysis in this section suggests that servicers may not have shifted resources from
servicing loans in the control group to the treatment group. These results suggest that the
servicing technology is such that the marginal cost of offering an additional modification for a
given servicer is roughly constant. This is likely to be the case if the main costs of performing
private modifications were mostly of the fixed type, such as setting infrastructure.27 Under this
27

This is not the only theoretically possible servicing technology. For example, another possible servicing
technology could be that marginal cost of modifying an additional loan is increasing in the total number of
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scenario, servicers would simply modify more loans in the treatment group as a result of the
program subsidies, leaving their operations in the control group unchanged. Combining the
results of this section with those we found in Section V paints a picture that is consistent with
this inference. Servicers modified more loans in the treatment group—with the more promising
candidates for modifications channeled under HAMP to take advantage of program incentive
payments—leaving modifications in the control group relatively unchanged.
VI.C Other Tests
The main results presented in earlier sections survive several additional robustness tests. We
discuss these very briefly in this section, not reporting details for brevity reasons.
The first set of tests ensure that our findings using the main empirical strategy are not driven by
differences in treatment and control group loans in the pre-program period. In particular, as
discussed earlier, our analysis in Internet Appendix A.1 shows that the delinquency rates in the
treatment and control groups track each other closely in the pre-program period with no apparent
differential pre-trend in this period. We obtain similar inferences if we employ other observables
instead of delinquency and perform the analysis like Internet Appendix A.1. Next, we estimate
our specification for a sample of treatment and control loans that are closely matched on
observables, including their past delinquency history. In particular, in each of the quarters we
only include loans in the control group that are nearest neighbor-matched with treatment loans
based on the Mahalanobis distance metric. Estimating our regressions on this sample again yields
very comparable results. In addition, we also re-estimate our main specification allowing for preexisting trend and find qualitatively as well as quantitatively similar results. For example, using a
specification with pre-existing trend, we find that the program resulted in the overall increase in
the quarterly modification rate of 0.131% compared to our base estimate of 0.144% increase.
The second set of tests assess if the (constant) pre-program difference in modification rates
between the treatment and control group for first empirical strategy could be driving some of our
findings. In particular, the concern is that if a certain group of loans–say those in the treatment
sample–were more sensitive to a macro state variable, the propensity to modify these loans could
continue grow at a faster pace relative to those in the control sample. Note that our second
empirical strategy does not suffer from this concern since there are virtually no pre-treatment
differences in treatment and control samples including their renegotiation rates (Figure 5(b)).
Nevertheless, to address this issue for our main empirical strategy, we also re-estimate our key
specifications using more flexible, non-linear specifications such as logistic regression. We find
that the estimates obtained from these specifications are similar to those reported in the paper.
For instance, using logistic specification we find that the program resulted in the overall increase
in the quarterly modification rate of 0.128% compared to our base estimate of 0.144% increase
(Table 3). Moreover, as a placebo test, we explore if there is differential change in the private
modifications performed by a servicer. In such a scenario, one would expect servicers to reduce their modifications
in the control group because the marginal cost of modifying loans would increase as more renegotiations are
performed in the treatment group due to program subsidies.
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modification rates between loans in the treatment and control groups handled by servicers who
did not participate in HAMP. These loans are classified based on criteria of our main empirical
strategy. We find no evidence for any change in the private modifications between the two
groups of loans around the program.
The treatment and control loans in the second strategy are much better matched. Nevertheless,
we also assess the robustness of our findings based on the second strategy by making the control
and treatment groups more comparable. In particular, we tighten the bound around the balance
threshold from which the treatment and control groups are constructed—instead of using loans
within $100,000 of the threshold, we consider only loans within $50,000 of the threshold. These
results, presented in Internet Appendix A.6 and A.7, again show that our inferences are similar.
We also investigate whether our modeling choices regarding when loans exit estimation sample
affect our estimates from both empirical strategies. We note that our specifications do already
control for the variety of loan and borrower characteristics. Thus, to the extent the composition
of our sample changes because of exit which is a function of loan observables, we do capture
such changes, at least in part, by controlling in our specifications for the characteristic of the
loans that remain in the sample. Nevertheless, since unobservables may matter for exit as well,
we conduct several other tests to investigate the robustness of our findings. In particular, we
estimate specifications that investigate changes in modification rate where we include loans in
the estimation sample even after their foreclosure. Note that by definition such loans cannot be
renegotiated since they have been foreclosed. The estimates from this specification are very
similar to those reported in the paper.28
Finally, we investigate whether the announcement of the program affected the behavior of
servicers prior to the program implementation. We note that there was a relatively small time
interval between announcement of the program and its implementation: the program was
announced in February 2009 and the details of the program as well as its implementation started
in March 2009. Nevertheless, we investigate whether there was a relative change in the
modification and foreclosure rate between treatment and control group from February 2009 to
March 2009. In particular, we follow the same specifications as in the paper (Panel A of Table 3
and Panel A of Table 5) but also include interaction of T with a dummy Pre that takes a value 1
in the period between February 2009 and March 2009 and is 0 otherwise. This interaction is
supposed to capture any differential changes in the behavior of servicers with respect to
treatment group relative to the control group in the period after the program announcement but
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Next, we perform our analysis of various outcomes among only delinquent loans, complementing our analysis of
foreclosures that we already performed in this subsample (see Table 5). The inference we obtain in this sample is
qualitatively similar but different in terms of economic significance when compared to estimates that are based on
the sample of all the loans. The reason is that delinquent loans are more likely to be modified or foreclosed. As
discussed in Section IV.A, we prefer conducting our analysis on all loans since delinquency of a loan was not the
criteria for giving a program modification per se and because delinquency could itself be an endogenous response to
the program.
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before its implementation. Our results reveal no evidence of any differential change in the
modification and foreclosure rates in the treatment and control groups between February 2009
and March 2009. It is also worth noting that there was considerable uncertainty surrounding the
possible national modification program prior to its announcement in February 2009 regarding
both its timing as well as its scope. Consistent with this notion, we find no significant relative
change in the modification and foreclosure rates in the treatment and control groups before
February 2009 as well. These results suggest that there was no differential change in the behavior
of servicers with respect to the treatment and control group loans in anticipation of the program.
VII. The Role of Servicers
Our analysis suggests that the take-up rate—that is, the number of trial modifications being
granted and the conversion rate of trial modifications to permanent modifications—under HAMP
was significantly lower compared with policy makers’ expectations. Although it is hard to know
what the optimal response to the program should have been, we now exploit heterogeneity in
response across servicers to try to understand some of the potential barriers to program
implementation.
The program’s effect on the extensive margin is not uniform across servicers in our sample. In
particular, there is significant variation in the rate of trial and permanent HAMP modifications
across servicers, with some servicers modifying at a rate that is more than four times the rate of
others. Importantly, this variation cannot be accounted for by differences in contract, borrower,
or regional characteristics of mortgages across servicers.29 To illustrate this, Figure 6(a) plots the
average quarterly trial and permanent HAMP modification rates across the sixteen main
servicing entities in our sample. These servicer-specific rates are obtained based on servicer
fixed effects in column (2) and column (4) of Table 2, Panel B. As we observe, the quarterly
rates of trial HAMP modifications vary from as little as 0.03% to almost 1% across servicers.
Similarly, the quarterly rates of permanent modifications vary substantially across servicers,
from about 0.02% to almost 0.8%. Together, these results imply substantial variation in the
conversion rates from trial modifications to permanent modifications across servicers (from less
than 30% to about 80%).
Interestingly, there was similar heterogeneity in the rate of private modifications offered across
these servicing entities in the pre-program period. Again, this variation cannot be accounted for
by differences in contract, borrower, or regional characteristics of mortgages across servicers.
This is illustrated in Figure 6(b), which plots the average quarterly permanent private
modification rates across the servicing entities in our sample. These servicer-specific preprogram rates are obtained from servicer fixed effects in a regression similar to column (4) of
Table 2, Panel B, but estimated on pre-program data. The pre-HAMP quarterly rates of
permanent private modifications vary substantially across these servicing entities (from less than
0.04% to 1.4%).
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In Panel A of Table 7 we investigate whether there is a relation between renegotiation intensity
of servicers in the pre-program period and the rate of permanent modifications induced by the
program across these entities. To do so we first construct an indicator variable, High Experience,
that takes a value of 1 for servicers that are above the median in terms of renegotiation intensity
in the pre-program period, and 0 otherwise. The servicer-specific renegotiation intensity in the
pre-program period is obtained as in Figure 6(b).
We start by using a specification using loans in the treatment group (as defined by Strategy 1),
where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a loan has received a given HAMP
modification and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) (Columns (3) and (4)) of Panel A of Table 7
show that loans serviced by servicers that did more renegotiations in the pre-program period are
much more likely to receive a trial (permanent) HAMP modification: the corresponding
likelihood is bigger by more than 1% (0.98%). These are large effects, since they suggest an
increase of about 58% (117%) relative to the overall mean trial (permanent) HAMP modification
rate for low-experience servicers in our sample period. It is worth reiterating that in these
specifications we control for all the observable collateral characteristics (FICO, LTV, interest
rates), loan ownership status (securitized or bank held), and for geography (state fixed effects).
We further assess the robustness of this finding by restricting our attention to treatment loans in
California and Florida, respectively. Focusing on loans in a specific state allows us to better
control for local economic conditions and variation in state laws. Moreover, we also account for
regional effects within these states by including zip code fixed effects corresponding to property
location in these specifications. The results are presented in Columns (5) and (6) of Panel A in
Table 7, where the standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Again, even with more
refined controls for geography we find that servicers with high pre-program renegotiation
experience perform many more permanent HAMP modifications. Strikingly, the permanent
HAMP modification rate among loans in California (Florida) during the program period is about
2.4% (1.7%) higher for high-experience servicers. This amounts to about a 180% (126%) higher
rate relative to the mean modification rate for servicers classified as having low experience.
Finally, as another robustness check, we estimate the specification restricting our attention to
treatment loans classified according to Strategy 2. Recall that this sample consists of betterquality mortgages given to owner-occupants with similar loan balances. Consistent with our
earlier results, Column (7) of Panel A shows that high-experience servicers are much more likely
to offer permanent HAMP modification: the corresponding likelihood is higher by 1.73% in
absolute terms.30 We find similar effects if we cluster at the level of servicers in the regressions
that are presented (unreported for brevity). Overall, our results show that the persistent lower
renegotiation activity of some servicers—both before and during the program—cannot be
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We also estimated specifications in Columns (5)–(7) of Panel A (Table 7) for trial HAMP modifications. The
findings and inferences are similar to those for permanent modifications (unreported for brevity).
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accounted by the heterogeneity in observable characteristics of loans in their servicing
portfolios.31
For completeness, we also examine foreclosure decisions across servicers. We find evidence that
the foreclosure rates are measurably lower for high-experience servicers relative to lowexperience ones for delinquent loans consistent with their higher renegotiation activity (see
Internet Appendix A.8). We also assess the changes in extensive and intensive margins based on
servicer experience redoing the analysis similar to Section V.A and V.B. Our results suggest that
there is no adverse effect on extensive margin across servicers, but those with lower pre-program
renegotiation experience display a much smaller increase in the combined (private and HAMP)
permanent modification rate due to the program. Moreover, similar to results in Section V, we
find evidence of adverse impact on intensive margin of permanent modifications for both types
of servicers (unreported for brevity).
In sum, our findings indicate that that there is a strong positive relationship between
renegotiation intensity of servicers in the pre-program period and the rate of permanent
modifications induced by HAMP across these entities. While contract, borrower, and regional
characteristics of mortgages are important determinants of renegotiation activity of a servicer,32
the differential and persistent patterns of renegotiation across servicers cannot be accounted for
by these factors. Another possibility that could explain the nature of servicer renegotiation
experience in the pre-program period relates to the organizational capability of the servicers.
Organizational factors, such as the quality of the workforce, incentives, and technology, have
been found to be responsible for differences in productivity across manufacturing firms
(Syverson 2010). Recall that the program requires the servicers to verify numerous eligibility
criteria regarding the applicant status prior to offering modification. This requires servicers to
employ appropriate infrastructure and sufficiently trained staff.33 Thus, we evaluate whether such
organizational differences are related with renegotiation experience of servicers.
In Panel B of Table 7, we relate servicer organizational characteristics with pre-program
renegotiation experience and find significant relationships between several variables. We collect
information on organizational variables of servicers around the introduction of the program from
the residential mortgage servicer reports generated by the three rating agencies (Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch). We aggregate the servicers affiliated with the same institution—the
level at which many of these servicer reports are available—to conduct this analysis. In Column
(1), the number of full-time servicing staff is positively correlated with the intensity of
31

We also note that each of the servicers in our sample services significant number of loans both issued with and
without government guarantees (e.g., on average the high experience servicers have around 50% loans issued with
government guarantee while the other servicers have around 62% loans issued with government guarantee). Thus, it
is unlikely that the results on high renegotiation activity in the pre-program period persisting into the program period
can be explained by some servicers that primarily service (or do not service) GSE loans.
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For instance, Agarwal et al. (2011) use within servicer variation to show that servicers renegotiate loans they own
at a faster rate relative to similar loans that are securitized. Similarly, factors such as credit score of the borrower and
loan-to-value of the mortgage are also important determinants of renegotiation rates.
33
For instance, processing applications for program modifications involves direct contact between servicer and
borrower, potentially through a call center, in order to collect relevant information.
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renegotiations conducted by the servicer in the pre-program period. Column (2) confirms that
servicers that conducted more renegotiations did have less-constrained staff, as measured by
loans per full-time employee. Next, in Column (3), we find that servicers with more
renegotiation experience also are the ones who devote more hours to training their employees--a
proxy for the quality of the servicing staff. Finally, in Columns (4) and (5) we find that servicers
who are more efficient in handling the phone queries—as proxied by the lower percentage of
calls dropped and the smaller average call holding time—also conducted more renegotiations.
These patterns are also visible in Internet Appendix A.9.
Overall, our analysis provides suggestive evidence that the nature of pre-program renegotiation
activity conducted by servicers is related to their organizational capabilities. In particular,
servicers with higher pre-program renegotiation activity appear to have the specialized skills and
infrastructure that is conducive to conducting loan workout. It seems reasonable to conjecture
that given these skills and infrastructure before the program, these same servicers were able to
extend more modifications under the program.
We end this section by doing a naive counterfactual computation: we compute what the effect of
the program would be if the low-experience servicers were to renegotiate the loans at the same
rate as their high-experience counterparts. Since 75% of the loans are serviced by low-experience
servicers, our estimates imply that HAMP would have induced about 70% more permanent
HAMP modifications, if the loans by low-experience servicers were renegotiated at the same rate
as their high-experience counterparts. This would translate into about 800,000 more
modifications induced by the program tracked until its original end date (December 2012).
VIII. Impact of HAMP on House Prices and Other Outcome Variables
In this section, we explore the impact of the program on regional outcome variables such as
house prices, consumption, and delinquency rates on other categories of consumer debt. The goal
from this exercise is to inform on the effect of debt relief programs such as HAMP, on broader
set of economic outcomes when such programs are implemented intensively. The challenge for
using HAMP as an episode to infer such a connection is that, as we have shown, there was a
relatively muted response to the program. We circumvent this challenge by using the results
from the previous section, and exploiting regional heterogeneity in the share of loans in a region
that are serviced by “high-experience” servicers just prior to the program. Because servicer
concentration in a region is determined prior to the program and is very persistent over time in
the data, we can trace out the effects of HAMP on different economic outcomes using variation
in this ex-ante measure of the program exposure.
Exploiting such regional variation in HAMP exposure allows us to assess what the impact of this
program on various outcomes was when it was implemented intensively. The idea is to compare
the economic outcomes in regions that had high concentration of loans serviced by highexperience servicers before the program—and therefore were also regions more likely to receive
HAMP modifications—to otherwise similar regions with a low concentration of loans serviced
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by these servicers. This approach is similar to that used by Mian and Sufi (2010) in their study of
the effects of the “Cash-for-Clunkers” program.
VIII.A Empirical Design
Our empirical strategy of exploring the impact of the program on regional outcome variables
relies on zip code data, because we do not have more micro data for variables like house prices.
We confine our analysis to zip codes that have at least 250 mortgages in the OCC database, and
this leaves us with a sample of about 10,000 zip codes. Imposing this restriction, which allows
for reliable estimates, does not change the sample composition much—for instance, the mean
share of loans serviced by high-experience servicers in a zip code in the restricted sample is very
close to the overall share of these loans in an entire data set (roughly 25%).
We first verify that our ex ante measure of regional HAMP exposure based on a share of loans
serviced by high-experience servicers in a zip code before the program indeed correlates with the
subsequent treatment from the program. We note that servicer concentration in a region is very
persistent over time, with around 95% of loans continuing to have the same servicer that handled
these loans at their origination. In Column (1) of Panel A of Table 8, we present the results of a
regression in which the dependent variable is a fraction of modified loans under HAMP in a zip
code during 2009:Q2 and 2010:Q4, and the explanatory variable is a fraction of loans serviced
by institutions classified as high experience in a zip code as of March 2009 (High Experience
Share). As we observe, there is a strong positive association between the fraction of HAMPmodified loans and the share of loans serviced by high-experience servicers in a zip code. A onestandard-deviation increase in the high experience share (about 25% relative increase) is
associated with a 0.12% absolute increase in the fraction of HAMP-modified loans in a zip code
(around a 13% increase in relative terms with respect to the mean zip code fraction of HAMPmodified loans). This is consistent with our results from the loan-level analysis (Section VI) and
demonstrates that zip codes with a larger ex ante measure of the program exposure—a higher
share of loans serviced by high-experience servicers as of March 2009—did subsequently
receive more treatment ex post (2009:Q2–2010:Q4).
In our main analysis, we want to compare regions with large differences in how intensively the
program was implemented. We use share of loans serviced by high experience servicers in a zip
code before the program to generate such variation. More specifically, we construct such regions
by restricting our sample to zip codes in the top quartile (high exposure group) and bottom
quartile (low exposure group) in terms of a share of loans in the zip code serviced by highexperience servicers as of March 2009. While these regions provide us with significant variation
in program exposure -- and consequently in the intensity of program implementation -- they may
differ on several dimensions such as collateral quality being serviced. Accordingly, we need to
make sure that we focus on zip codes that are otherwise as similar as possible. We do so by
selecting regions from the high and low exposure groups using propensity score matching. In
particular, we construct the nearest neighbor-matched sample of control zip codes based on the
Mahalanobis distance metric. This approach employs a large set of matching covariates,
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including zip-code-level averages of the FICO score of borrowers, interest rates, LTV, and
delinquency rates in the pre-program period (2008:Q3 to 2009:Q1). We end up with 990 zip
codes, equally split between high and low exposure groups, after this matching exercise.
Figure 7 presents the time series evolution of characteristics of matched high and low exposure
zip codes. The mean FICO score, interest rates, LTV, and fraction of loans transitioning from
current to 60-day delinquency are close to each other across these group of zip codes and follow
a similar pattern in the pre-program period. Internet Appendix A.10(a) presents private
modifications in the two groups around the program. Since the high exposure group has a higher
proportion of loans serviced by high-experience servicers, consistent with evidence in Section
VII, the level of private modifications is higher in this group. However, more importantly, there
is constant difference in the private modification rates between the high and low exposure zip
codes in the pre-program period. Notably, at the same time, the percentage of loans serviced by
high experience intermediaries in a zip code ranges from more than 50% in the high exposure
group to 6% in the low exposure group.
Columns (2) and (3) reveal that the strong positive association between the fraction of HAMPmodified loans and the share of loans serviced by high-experience servicers in a zip code is also
found in the matched sample. In this sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in the high
experience share (about 33% relative increase) is associated with a 0.23% absolute increase in
the fraction of HAMP-modified loans in a zip code (about 16% relative increase with respect to
the mean fraction of HAMP-modified loans in a zip code). Internet Appendix A.10(b) confirms
this inference by plotting the average combined permanent program and private modifications in
the matched sample of high and low exposure zip codes. It shows that there is a sizeable increase
in the permanent modifications in the high exposure group relative to the low exposure one
during the program period. Notably, when combined with patterns in Internet Appendix A.10(a),
it is clear that the differential increase in the rate of permanent modifications in the high
exposure zip codes during the program period is driven by more intensive program
implementation in these zip codes.
VIII.B Impact on Foreclosures and House Prices
We start by analyzing how the quarterly rate of foreclosures varies with program exposure in
regions with large differences in how intensively the program was implemented. To do so, we
use our matched sample and estimate a regression with change in the zip code quarterly rate of
foreclosures between the program and pre-program period as the dependent variable, and High
Experience Share as the explanatory variable. As we observe from Column (1) of Panel B of
Table 8, zip codes with a larger high experience share saw a more decline in the foreclosure rate.
The estimates suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in high-experience share (33%
relative increase) is associated with about 0.07% decline in a quarterly foreclosure rate (about
18% decrease relative to the mean foreclosure rate in the pre-program period). Column (2) shows
that these results are robust to including controls. These results are similar in spirit to those
obtained with loan-level analysis in Section V.
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Next, we examine the differences in house price growth in regions classified on the basis of their
exposure to the program. Several recent papers argue that foreclosures create downward pressure
on house prices (Campbell et al. 2010; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011). Accordingly, we are
interested in examining if regions with more exposure to HAMP—which are also the regions that
experienced relative decline in foreclosure rates in the program period—saw an increase in house
prices relative to regions with limited program exposure.
Similar to analysis with foreclosure rates, we use the matched sample and estimate a regression
with a change in the quarterly house price growth between the program and pre-program period
as the dependent variable and High Experience Share as the explanatory variable. The estimate
in Panel B of Table 8 (Column (3)) indicates that zip codes with a larger high experience share
saw an increase in the growth rate of house prices. In particular, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the high-experience share is associated with about a 0.45% relative increase in the
quarterly growth rate of house prices. As Column (4) shows, this estimate is robust to adding zipcode-level controls.
An alternative way to illustrate these findings is to exploit only the differences between high and
low exposure regions. Figure 8(a) plots the mean quarterly house price growth in high and low
exposure zip codes. The zip-code-level house price data come from CoreLogic. While the
difference between low and high exposure zip codes remains relatively stable before the program
announcement, the gap between these groups grows from mid-2009. In other words, zip codes
with significant exposure to the program saw a meaningful relative increase in house prices after
the program’s introduction, at least in the near term. Moreover, the increase in the growth rate of
house prices in the high exposure group during the program period broadly coincides with the
timing and intensity of program modifications, including trial ones (see Figure 3(a)).
It is, of course, possible that part of this house price change reflects a change in the composition
of transacted properties due to the relative lower intensity of foreclosure sales in the high
exposure zip codes relative to low exposure ones. To assess the robustness of our results to this
concern, we repeat this exercise using the CoreLogic house price index, which excludes
distressed transactions. The estimates using this series are presented in Columns (5) and (6) of
Panel B of Table 8. Our inferences remain unchanged. Figure 8(b) demonstrates the same results
between high and low exposure zip codes graphically.
Finally, note that the timing of the results on house prices compare well with an uptick in trial
and permanent program modifications in the high exposure group of zip codes relative to low
exposure ones. As Internet Appendix 10.(b) shows there is an increase in permanent
modifications due to the program in the high exposure group relative to low exposure one from
the beginning of 2010. A similar plot for trial modifications shows an uptick six months earlier
(unreported for brevity).
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VIII.C Impact on Consumption and Delinquencies on Other Consumer Credit
Next, we investigate the impact of HAMP on other outcome variables, such as durable (e.g.,
growth rates of auto sales) and non-durable consumption and delinquencies on other consumer
credit. The motivation for looking at these variables follows from arguments made by proponents
of household debt relief programs that suggest that lowering household debt level during the
crisis may help alleviate distortions in consumption and investment decisions of households.
In Figure 8(c), we plot the time-series evolution of growth rates in new auto sales in high and
low exposure zip codes. We first note that there is no differential change in the growth rate of
auto sales between these groups in the close vicinity of the program announcement. This
provides additional evidence that the zip codes in our matched sample faced similar economic
conditions around the introduction of the program—yielding further support to our empirical
design. Importantly, Figure 8(c) shows no discernible change in auto sales in high exposure zip
codes relative to low exposure ones during the program period. Panel C of Table 8 (Columns (1)
and (2)) confirms this inference in a regression setting.
Similarly, columns (3) and (4) of Panel C of Table 8 reveal no statistical relation between growth
rate of consumer spending on non-durables -- i.e., groceries including food and beverages, drugs,
health and beauty care and general merchandise -- and high experience share. This is also
corroborated in Internet Appendix A.11 where we plot the quarterly growth rates of overall nondurable spending as well as when it is broken into groceries and non-grocery categories in the
high and low exposure zip codes. We also note that our results on durable and non-durable
consumption are not likely due to potentially low power induced by our empirical strategy since
we do find significant effects for house-prices, foreclosures and, in what follows, delinquencies
on other consumer debt.
Figure 8(d) plots the time-series evolution of change in the quarterly delinquency rate on
consumer credit in the high and low exposure zip codes. This figure suggests that there was a
meaningful relative decline in the delinquency rates of consumer credit in zip codes with high
program exposure. Panel C of Table 8 (Columns (5) and (6)) confirms these results in a
regression setting. The estimates in the table suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in
high-experience share in a zip code is associated, on average, with about a 0.23% decrease in the
zip code quarterly delinquency rate on consumer debt in the program period relative to the preprogram period. In additional tests, we separate consumer credit in separate categories such as
home equity line of credit (Columns (7) and (8)), and auto loans and credit cards (unreported for
brevity), and find similar significant effects in these categories.
VIII.D Implications
A number of insights emerge from the analysis in this section. First, our evidence suggests that
mortgage debt relief programs, when used with sufficient intensity, may have a meaningful
impact on foreclosure rates, delinquencies on non-targeted consumer debt, and house prices. In
particular, recall that on average a permanent HAMP modification resulted in about 20%
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reduction in payments in our sample, a saving in the order of $350 per month. Hence our
estimates from Table 8 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in the high-experience
share--which would translate into such reduction of payments for 16% more borrowers in
relative terms during the program period--would be associated with about 1.8% annual increase
in house prices and about 1% annual decrease in consumer debt delinquencies. In this respect,
this evidence supports the recent studies that show that establish a link between foreclosures and
house prices (e.g., Campbell et al. 2010; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011).
Second, and more important, our results also suggest that such programs targeted at distressed
borrowers may not necessarily result in a sizeable increase in consumption, at least in the near
term. As we saw, distressed borrowers who found mortgages to be more affordable after HAMP
renegotiation did not significantly alter their consumption patterns. Instead, these borrowers used
the additional cash to service and pay down their consumer debt. Thus, the results in our paper
suggest that distressed borrowers who are in the process of debt deleveraging may have a
relatively low spending multiplier from moderate debt reduction, at least in the near term. These
findings are consistent with arguments and empirical evidence in Mian, Sufi, and Rao (2011) and
corroborates their view that large accumulation of household debt prior to the crisis is an
important factor adversely affecting household consumption.
It is important to stress that our findings do not imply that a widespread debt relief program
would not stimulate household consumption. It is possible that the program targeting the general
population instead of a select group of distressed borrowers could have such consequences.
Moreover, there may be a more pronounced impact on consumption at longer horizons than what
we study in the paper. Despite these caveats, our findings provide valuable guidance on what the
effect of debt relief programs on broader economic outcomes might be, were such programs
implemented intensively.
IX. Conclusion
We find that renegotiations induced by HAMP and its effects will fall significantly short (twothirds) of the target of this intervention. This is mostly because a few large servicers, with preprogram organizational design that was less conducive to conducting renegotiations, responded
at half the rate of others. The muted response of these servicers cannot be accounted for by
differences in contract, borrower, or regional characteristics of mortgages across servicers. The
fact that some other servicers with similar portfolios of distressed loans actively conducted
modifications under the program suggests that the incentive structure of the program may not
have been inadequate per se. Rather, the program failed to account for firm level factors that
inhibited the response of some servicers. The presence of these factors—and the lack of
understanding of their specific nature—poses a significant challenge to the ability of the
government to quickly influence such intermediaries through provision of financial incentives,
thus hampering policies that require voluntary participation of such firms. This lesson is not only
applicable to HAMP but may also apply to other initiatives undertaken by the administration in
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response to the foreclosure crisis. For example, effective policies aimed at reducing the cost of
debt through mortgage refinancing, such as HARP or quantitative easing initiatives, require
significant refinancing activity by intermediaries. Our paper suggests that such policies may also
face significant hurdles due to the limited organizational capabilities of some financial
intermediaries.
Our findings also suggest that the reallocation of resources that could promote more effective
implementation of the program—for example, through private contracting to allow the transfer
of distressed mortgages to more efficient servicers, similar to provisions that exist in the
commercial real estate sector, or through the entry of better and more capable servicers—must
have faced significant hurdles. Figuring out what these challenges that prevent reallocation of
resources are, especially in times of crisis, is an interesting avenue for future research.
Our results also provide guidance for designing large-scale renegotiation programs in the future.
In particular, our evidence suggests that HAMP did not lead to widespread strategic defaults,
likely because of the extensive screening related to its eligibility criteria and its design of
incentives for servicers. However, these factors may also have stalled the pace of the program.
For example, verification of extensive eligibility criteria may have been challenging for servicers
with less renegotiation experience, contributing to their low response to the program. These
findings can be compared to the results from a simple modification program that employed only
serious delinquency as its main eligibility criterion, as studied in Mayer et al. (2011), which led
to significant strategic behavior. Consequently, there is a likely tradeoff between screening more
intensively to reduce strategic behavior, which limits the unintended effects of the program, and
the reach and pace of the program.
Finally, because incentive payments were triggered only by permanent HAMP modifications,
one could use the ratio of estimated permanent modifications induced by the program to
foreclosures prevented in assessing the program’s success.34 Admittedly, this would be a very
naive computation, since it ignores other costs (or benefits) of program implementation, as well
as any aggregate or redistributional effects in the economy. Likewise, such a computation would
not account for the potential impact of the program on the behavior of borrowers and lenders in
the future or whether these foreclosures would be prevented in the longer term. As a result, we
refrain from this exercise. More generally, in the absence of a model of what optimal level of
renegotiations and foreclosures should be, we cannot determine whether HAMP helped correct a
“market failure.” Devising such a model is a fruitful area of future research.

34

In particular, our results suggest that for every ten permanent modifications induced by the program there are
about seven fewer foreclosures. One could potentially compute the benefit of the program based on studies that
quantify the deadweight losses of foreclosures. Such benefits could be compared with the direct cost of providing
incentives for the additional HAMP modification (around $4,500 per modification).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Control and Treatment Group in the Pre-Program Period
This table presents summary statistics of key variables in the pre-HAMP period (2008: Q3 to 2009: Q1) in the treatment and control groups formed on the basis of Strategy 1
and the trial and permanent HAMP quarterly modification rates in the treatment group during the program period (2009: Q2 to 2010: Q4). The treatment group consists of loans
with owner-occupied status and with outstanding balance below $729,750, while the control group consists of loans with non-owner-occupied (investor) status.
Pre-program period:

Control

Treatment

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

FICO

717

1.0

710

1.0

LTV %

70.3

0.4

70.6

0.2

Interest rate %

6.1

0.1

6.2

0.1

60+ delinquency % [Quarterly]

1.7

0.2

1.6

0.2

Private Permanent modifications % (all loans) [Quarterly]

0.3

0.1

0.4

0.2

Foreclosure complete % (all loans) [Quarterly]

0.4

0.001

0.3

0.001

Foreclosure complete % (delinquent loans) [Quarterly]

2.6

2.0

1.6

1.0

Number of loans as of March 2009
Program period:
Modification rate (%) [Quarterly]
Number of Trial HAMP modification

3,005,537

17,778,672

Trial HAMP Modifications
0.432
522,365
Permanent HAMP Modifications

Modification rate (%) [Quarterly]

0.165

Number of Permanent HAMP modification

199,515

Conversion Rate: Trial to Permanent HAMP

38.2%

Table 2: Trial and Permanent HAMP Modifications: Relation with Borrower and Contract Characteristics
The table presents OLS estimates from regressions that relate whether or not a trial or a permanent HAMP modification was offered to a loan and various borrower and
contract-level characteristics. The sample includes loans that are eligible for HAMP based on owner-occupancy status (Strategy 1). In Columns (1)–(2) the dependent variable
takes the value of 1 if a given loan received a trial HAMP modification during the program period (2009:Q2–2010:Q4) and is 0 otherwise. In Columns (3)–(4) the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if a given loan received a permanent HAMP modification during the program period and is 0 otherwise. FICO is the borrower’s credit score at loan
origination. LTV is the loan origination loan-to-value ratio. Interest Rate is the loan interest rate in percentage terms. Origination Amount is the loan initial balance (in
thousands of dollars). Low Doc is the dummy that takes value of 1 if a loan was originated with limited documentation and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination
variables such as loan type (ARM, option ARM) and the loan ownership status. Origination FE includes loan origination year fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan
servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property. Standard errors are clustered at the state level; t-statistics are in parentheses. The
estimates are expressed in percentage terms (e.g., -0.02 estimate reported for FICO in Column (1) means that an increase of FICO by 1 is associated with a 0.02% absolute
decrease in the likelihood of loan receiving a HAMP trial modification).
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a trial
HAMP during the program
period
(1)
(2)
FICO
LTV
Interest Rate
Origination Amount
Low Doc
Observations
Adj. R-square
Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE

Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a
permanent HAMP during the
program period
(3)
(4)

-0.02
(9.70)
1.167
(4.29)
0.356
(3.64)
0.003
(4.56)
0.781
(11.44)

-0.021
(9.42)
2.397
(4.14)
0.385
(4.67)
0.001
(1.07)
0.720
(11.30)

-0.008
(7.80)
0.426
(4.15)
0.069
(1.61)
0.001
(5.38)
0.326
(6.67)

-0.008
(7.58)
0.954
(3.92)
0.081
(2.27)
0.0004
(1.15)
0.303
(5.87)

17,273,971
0.039
Yes
Yes
No

17,273,971
0.041
Yes
Yes
Yes

17,273,971
0.016
Yes
Yes
No

17,273,971
0.018
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Table 3: Rate of Permanent Modifications
The table presents OLS estimates from regressions that track whether or not a permanent modification is offered to a loan around the program implementation. The
dependent variable takes the value of 1 in the quarter a given loan receives a modification for the first time and is 0 otherwise. The modified loans exit the estimation
sample. Panel A shows the results for all loans. The variable T takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined by Strategy 1 (owner-occupied
loan) and is 0 otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination variables such as
FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates and their squares, loan documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination FE includes
loan origination year fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property.
Estimation period is 2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level; t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimates are expressed in percentage terms.
Panel A: Rate of Permanent Modifications: All Loans
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a private permanent
modification
in a quarter
(1)
(2)
(3)
T

Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a combined
permanent modification (private and
HAMP) in a quarter
(4)

0.190
(8.39)
0.014
(1.3)
0.471

0.213
(8.40)
0.021
(1.27)
0.454

0.209
(6.43)
0.020
(1.27)
0.453

0.205
(7.21)
0.144
(5.40)
0.492

(12.57)

(13.03)

(13.33)

(12.11)

Observations
Adj. R-square

175,910,892
0.012

175,910,892
0.013

175,910,892
0.014

175,166,092
0.015

Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

State FE

No

No

Yes

Yes

T* After
After

Table 3: Rate of Permanent Modifications (contd.)
The table presents OLS estimates from regressions that track whether or not a permanent modification is offered to a loan around the program implementation. The
dependent variable takes the value of 1 in the quarter a given loan receives a modification for the first time and is 0 otherwise. The modified loans exit the estimation
sample. Panel B shows the results in a sample of loans issued without guarantees from the government-sponsored entities (non-agency) and a sample of loans issued with
such guarantees (agency loans), respectively. The variable T takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined by Strategy 1 (owner-occupied loan) and
is 0 otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination variables such as FICO credit
score, LTV, interest rates and their squares, loan documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination FE includes loan origination
year fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property. Estimation period is
2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level; t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimates are expressed in percentage terms.

Panel B: Rate of Permanent Modifications: Agency and Non-Agency Loans
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a private
permanent modification
in a quarter
Agency
Non-Agency

Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a combined
permanent modification (private and
HAMP) in a quarter
Agency
Non-Agency

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.367
(6.44)
0.056
(0.74)
0.178
(8.07)
41,653,494

0.112
(7.16)
0.134
(4.92)
0.492
(11.59)

0.381
(6.16)
0.151
(4.38)
0.181
(8.89)

Observations

0.107
(7.04)
0.001
(1.02)
0.473
(12.04)
110,306,351

109,964,456

41,245,687

Adj. R-square

0.06

0.013

0.08

0.016

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Origination FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Servicer FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

T
T* After
After
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Table 4: Composition of Modifications and Redefault Conditional on a Modification
The table presents OLS estimates from regressions that track the composition of modifications and redefault rate conditional on a loan having received a modification
around the program implementation. The sample consists of permanently modified loans. In Panel A, we assess the composition of modifications. In Column (1) the
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a given loan modification includes rate reduction and is 0 otherwise. In Column (2) the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a
given loan modification includes term extension and is 0 otherwise. In Column (3) the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a given loan modification includes principal
write-down and is 0 otherwise. In Column (4) the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a given loan modification includes interest rate capitalization. The variable T
takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined by Strategy 1 (owner-occupied loan) and is 0 otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 if the
modification took place after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination variables such as FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates and their squares, loan
documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination FE includes loan origination fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan
servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property. Estimation period is 2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level; t-statistics are in the parentheses. The estimates are expressed in percentage terms.
Panel A: Composition of Modifications

T
T* After
After
Observations
R-square
Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE
State FE

Dependent variable:
Whether a modified loan in
a quarter gets a rate
reduction
(1)
10.04
(4.40)
-11.14
(2.52)
29.63
(6.81)
1,198,049
0.165
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Dependent variable:
Whether a modified loan in
a quarter gets a term
extension
(2)
1.23
(0.70)
-9.33
(2.22)
17.53
(4.30)
1,198,049
0.245
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Dependent variable:
Whether a modified loan in
a quarter gets a principal
write-down
(3)
1.12
(2.91)
-2.16
(3.30)
3.73
(3.02)
1,198,049
0.656
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Dependent variable:
Whether a modified loan in
a quarter gets a
capitalization
(4)
-7.14
(4.80)
9.76
(3.61)
8.18
(3.01)
1,198,049
0.239
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 4: Composition of Modifications and Redefault Conditional on a Modification (contd.)
The table presents OLS estimates from regressions that track the composition of modifications and redefault rate conditional on a loan having received a modification
around the program implementation. The sample consists of permanently modified loans. In Panel B, we assess the change in redefault rate conditional on a loan having
received a modification. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a loan status becomes 60 days past due or worse on payments in the first six months after
modification and is 0 otherwise. The variable T takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined by Strategy 1 (owner-occupied loan) and is 0
otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 if the modification took place after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination variables such as FICO
credit score, LTV, interest rates and their squares, loan documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination FE includes loan
origination fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property. Estimation period is
2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level; t-statistics are in the parentheses. The estimates are expressed in percentage terms.
Panel B: Redefault Conditional on Modification
Dependent variable: Whether a modified loan redefaults within six months after receiving a modification
T
T* After
After
Observations
R-square
Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE
State FE

(1)
0.15
(1.21)
-0.02
(0.21)
-0.21
(1.31)
1,064,296
0.0001
No
No
No
No

(2)
0.39
(2.02)
-0.14
(1.02)
-0.05
(0.21)
921,871
0.0023
Yes
No
No
No

(3)
0.42
(2.11)
-0.18
(1.31)
0.04
(0.13)
921,871
0.0023
Yes
Yes
No
No
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(4)
0.49
(3.13)
-0.35
(2.30)
0.28
(1.30)
921,871
0.0051
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

(5)
0.46
(3.24)
-0.35
(2.30)
0.27
(1.30)
921,871
0.0061
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 5: Foreclosures and Delinquencies
Panel A presents OLS estimates from regressions that analyze whether or not a loan was foreclosed around the program implementation. The dependent variable takes the
value of 1 in the quarter that a given loan is foreclosed (completed) and is 0 otherwise. The foreclosed loans exit the estimation sample. The sample consists of all loans in
columns (1)–(3) and delinquent loans in columns (4)–(6). The variable T takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined by Strategy 1 (owneroccupied loan), and is 0 otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination variables
such as FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates and their squares, loan documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination FE
includes loan origination year fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property
backing the loan. Estimation period is 2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level; t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimates are expressed in
percentage terms.
Panel A: Foreclosures
Dependent variable: Whether a loan was foreclosed in a quarter
Sample: All loans

Sample: Delinquent loans

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.164
(5.21)
-0.127
(3.13)
0.364
(5.03)

-0.133
(3.72)
-0.126
(3.13)
0.372
(5.15)

-0.120
(3.55)
-0.129
(3.15)
0.372
(5.17)

-1.32
(2.36)
-2.03
(5.39)
3.858
(6.03)

-0.619
(1.08)
-1.92
(5.45)
3.808
(6.04)

-0.603
(1.43)
-1.96
(5.64)
3.936
(6.63)

Observations
Adj. R-square

178,917,320
0.001

178,917,320
0.001

178,917,320
0.002

13,658,925
0.012

13,658,925
0.014

13,658,925
0.022

Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

State FE

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

T
T* After
After
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Table 5: Foreclosures and Delinquencies (contd.)
Panel B presents OLS estimates from regressions that track whether or not a loan becomes delinquent around the program implementation. The dependent variable takes the
value of 1 in the quarter that a given loan transitions for the first time to serious delinquency (60 days past due on payments) and is 0 otherwise. Once a loan reaches a
serious delinquency status for the first time, it exits the estimation sample. The variable T takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group as defined by Strategy
1 (owner-occupied loan), and is 0 otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Other Controls include origination
variables such as FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates and their squares, loan documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination
FE includes loan origination year fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan servicers fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property
backing the loan. Estimation period is 2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level; t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimates are expressed in
percentage terms.
Panel B: Delinquencies

T
T*After
After
Observations
Adj. R-squared
Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE
State FE

Dependent variable:
Whether a loan becomes delinquent in a quarter
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.132
0.013
-0.039
-0.02
(1.33)
(0.14)
(0.32)
(0.32)
0.088
0.035
0.024
0.027
(1.81)
(0.72)
(0.52)
(0.43)
-0.245
-0.147
-0.143
-0.171
(2.80)
(1.81)
(1.70)
(1.83)
179,871,929
179,871,929
179,871,929 179,871,929
0.013
0.014
0.015
0.017
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
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Table 6: Alternative Empirical Strategy: Modifications, Redefault Rates, and Foreclosure Rates
Panel A presents summary statistics of key variables in the pre-HAMP period (2008:Q3 to 2009:Q1) in the treatment and control groups formed using Strategy 2 and the
trial and permanent HAMP quarterly modification rates in the treatment group during the program period 2009:Q2 to 2010:Q4. Owner-occupied loans whose amount
outstanding is below $729,750 as of the date of announcement of the program (March 2009) form the treatment group, while owner-occupied loans with the balance above
this threshold form the control group. We restrict attention to loans that are within $100,000 of the threshold.
Panel A: Alternative Strategy: Summary Statistics for Control and Treatment Group
Pre-program period:

Control

Treatment

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

FICO

729

0.0

728

1.0

LTV %

64.5

0.1

65.6

0.1

Interest rate %

5.5

0.1

5.5

0.1

60+ delinquency % [Quarterly]

2.4

0.7

2.8

0.7

Private Permanent modifications % (all loans)
[Quarterly]

0.6

0.2

0.6

0.2

Foreclosure complete % (all loans) [Quarterly]

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.001

Foreclosure complete % (delinquent loans) [Quarterly]

1.0

0.7

0.8

0.7

Number of loans as of March 2009

62,373

126,717

Program period:

Trial HAMP Modifications

Modification rate (%) [Quarterly]

0.565

Number of Trial HAMP modification

4,489
Permanent HAMP Modifications

Modification rate (%) [Quarterly]

0.226

Number of Permanent HAMP modification

1,796

Conversion Rate: Trial to Permanent HAMP

40.04%
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Table 6: Alternative Empirical Strategy: Modifications, Redefault Rates, and Foreclosure Rates (contd.)
Panel B presents OLS estimates from regressions that track whether or not a permanent modification is offered to a loan, redefault rate conditional on receiving a
modification, and whether or not the loan was foreclosed, around the program implementation in the treatment and control groups. Owner-occupied loans whose amount
outstanding is below $729,750 as of the date of announcement of the program (March 2009) form the treatment group, while owner-occupied loans with the balance above
this threshold form the control group. We restrict attention to loans that are within $100,000 of the threshold. Column (1) uses the dependent variable that takes the value of
1 in the quarter that a given loan receives the permanent private modification for the first time and is 0 otherwise. The modified loans exit the estimation sample. Column (2)
uses the dependent variable that takes the value of 1 in the quarter that a given loan receives the permanent modification (private or HAMP) for the first time and is 0
otherwise. The modified loans exit the estimation sample. Column (3) presents the redefault estimates for the sample of permanently modified loans. The dependent variable
takes the value of 1 if a loan status becomes 60 days past due or worse on payments in the first six months after modification and is 0 otherwise. Columns (4) and (5) present
the OLS estimates for the sample of all loans (Column 3) and the sample of delinquent loans (Column 4). The dependent variable takes the value of 1 in the quarter that a
given loan is foreclosed and is 0 otherwise. The foreclosed loans exit the estimation sample. The variable T takes the value of 1 if a loan belongs to the treatment group and
is 0 otherwise. The variable After takes the value of 1 for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is zero otherwise. Other Controls include origination variables such as FICO credit
score, LTV, interest rate and their squares, loan documentation status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), and loan ownership status. Origination FE includes loan origination
year fixed effects, while Servicer FE includes loan servicers fixed effects. Estimation period is 2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors clustered at the state level; t-statistics are
in parentheses. Estimates are expressed in percentage terms.

Panel B: Alternative Strategy: Modifications, Redefault Rates, and Foreclosure Rates

T
T* After
After
Observations
Adj. R-squared
Other Controls
Origination FE
Servicer FE

All loans
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a
private permanent
modification
in given quarter
(1)
0.005
(0.22)
0.06
(1.88)
0.64
(2.53)
1,518,352
0.012
Yes
Yes
Yes

All loans
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a
combined permanent
modification (private and
HAMP) in given quarter
(2)
0.01
(0.43)
0.215
(2.34)
0.69
(2.61)
1,518,352
0.013
Yes
Yes
Yes

Modified loans

All loans

Delinquent loans

Dependent variable:
Whether a modified loan
redefaults within six months
after receiving a modification

Dependent variable:
Whether a loan was
foreclosed in a quarter

Dependent variable:
Whether a loan was
foreclosed in a quarter

(3)
-3.54
(2.01)
1.54
(1.23)
-14.64
(7.62)

(4)
-0.04
(2.86)
-0.03
(1.67)
0.62
(3.13)

(5)
-0.16
(1.21)
-0.59
(3.11)
3.23
(2.03)

12,084
0.057
Yes
Yes

1,559,665
0.008
Yes
Yes

194,987
0.017
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 7: Servicer Pre-HAMP Renegotiation Experience and HAMP Renegotiations
Panel A of the table shows the OLS estimates where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if a given loan received a trial HAMP (or permanent HAMP) modification
during the program period and is 0 otherwise. Columns (1)–(4) show the results for treatment loans as defined by Strategy 1. Column (5) and Column (6) show the results
for treatment loans (as defined by Strategy 1) in California and Florida, respectively. Column (7) shows the results for treatment loans as defined by Strategy 2. The High
Experience dummy takes the value of 1 if a loan is serviced by a servicer whose estimated renegotiation intensity in the pre-HAMP period is above median and is 0
otherwise. The estimated renegotiation intensity of each servicer is obtained based on servicer fixed effects in a regression similar to column (4) of Table 2, Panel B, but
estimated on pre-HAMP data. Other Controls include FICO credit score, LTV, interest rates, their squares, loan doc status, loan type (ARM, option ARM), the loan
ownership status, and the loan origination year fixed effects. State FE includes fixed effects for the location (state) of the property backing the loan. After takes a value of 1
for the quarters after Q1 2009 and is 0 otherwise. Estimation period 2008:Q3–2010:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the state level or at the zip code level (Column (5)
and (6)); t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimates are expressed in percentage terms.
Panel A: Servicer Pre-HAMP Renegotiation Experience and HAMP Renegotiations
Sample:
Sample:
Sample:
Sample:
Treatment loans
Treatment loans
Treatment loans
Treatment loans
in California
in Florida
(Strategy 1)
(Strategy 1)
(Strategy 1)
(Strategy 1)
Dependent variable:
Dependent variable:
Dependent variable:
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a
Whether a loan gets a
Whether a loan gets a trial
Whether a loan gets a
permanent HAMP
permanent HAMP
HAMP modification in a
permanent HAMP
modification in a
modification in a
quarter
modification in a quarter
quarter
quarter
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Sample:
Treatment loans
(Strategy 2)
Dependent variable:
Whether a loan gets a
permanent HAMP
modification in a
quarter
(7)

1.02
(3.33)

1.15
(3.35)

0.92
(4.08)

0.98
(4.03)

2.41
(4.39)

1.72
(4.12)

1.738
(5.71)

17,273,971
0.04

17,273,971
0.046

17,273,971
0.017

17,273,971
0.019

2,848,540
0.035

1,113,040
0.022

126,717
0.018

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FE

No

Yes

No

Yes

-

-

Yes

Zip Code FE

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

High Experience
Observations
Adj. R-square
Other Controls & Origination FE
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Table 7: Servicer Pre-HAMP Renegotiation Experience and HAMP Renegotiations (contd.)
In Panel B, we present correlation coefficients between renegotiation experience of servicers prior to HAMP (pre-HAMP mod rate) and servicer organization variables. The
pre-HAMP mod rate of servicers is obtained based on servicer fixed effects in a regression similar to column (4) of Table 2, Panel B, but estimated on pre-HAMP data. Fulltime staff (FTE) is the number of employees employed in servicing the loans. Loans-per-FTE is the average number of loans serviced by an employee in a year. Average
training hours refers to the hours dedicated by the servicing entity to training new (induction training) and old employees (continual training). % calls dropped refer to the
percentage of calls dropped by the call center receiving calls related to loan servicing. Phone hold time refers to the average hold time (in seconds) a customer has to wait on
a servicing call (see also Internet Appendix A.9).
Panel B: Correlation between Servicer Pre-HAMP Renegotiation Experience and Servicer Organizational Variables

pre-HAMP mod rate

Full time staff
(FTE)

Loans per FTE

(1)
52%

(2)
-57%

Average
Phone hold time
% Call Dropped
Tranining Hours
(sec)
(3)
14%

52

(4)
-43%

(5)
-49%

Table 8: Foreclosures, House Price Growth and Auto and Non-Durable Consumption Growth – Zip Code Level Analysis
Panel A reports OLS estimates of regression where the dependent variable is the percentage of modified loans under the program in a zip code during the program period
(2009:Q2 to 2010:Q4). The variable High Servicer Share is the fraction of loans serviced by high experience servicers in a zip code as of March 2009 (based on our
classification). Column (1) presents results for an overall sample of zip codes, while Column (2) and (3) present the results for the matched sample of zip codes. Panel B
reports OLS estimates of regressions evaluating the relationship between exposure to HAMP in a zip code and the change in the quarterly house price growth and the
foreclosure rate in a zip code. The change is between the program period (2009:Q2 to 2010:Q4) and the pre-program period (2008:Q3 to 2009:Q1). The sample consists of
matched zip codes as explained in Section VII.A. The estimates are scaled by one standard deviation of High Servicer Share variable and expressed in percentage terms. tstatistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Zip Code Ex Post HAMP Modifications and Ex Ante Exposure to HAMP (Share of Loans Serviced by High Experience Servicers)

High Servicer Share
Propensity Score Controls

Percentage of loans modified under HAMP
All loans
Matched Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.12
0.24
0.23
(14.23)
(5.54)
(5.75)
No
No
Yes

Mean HAMP Percentage

0.92

1.45

1.45

Number of Observations
Adj. R-squared

9,995
0.02

990
0.04

990
0.19

Panel B: Zip Code Outcomes and Ex Ante Exposure: House Prices and Foreclosures
Foreclosure rate

HPI growth

HPI growth
(excluding distressed sales)
(5)
(6)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Propensity Score Controls

-0.07
(5.88)
No

-0.08
(7.26)
Yes

0.45
(3.66)
No

0.47
(4.11)
Yes

0.51
(4.28)
No

0.53
(4.51)
Yes

Adj. R-squared

0.047

0.30

0.028

0.16

0.048

0.068

High Servicer Share
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Table 8: Foreclosures, House Price Growth and Auto and Non-Durable Consumption Growth – Zip Code Level Analysis (contd.)
Panel C reports OLS estimates of regressions evaluating the relationship between exposure to HAMP in a zip code and the change in quarterly auto sales growth, nondurable spending growth, consumer delinquencies, and home equity line of credit delinquencies (HELOCs) in a zip code. The quarterly change is between the program
period (2009:Q2 to 2010:Q4) and the pre-program period (2008:Q3 to 2009:Q1). The variable High Servicer Share is the fraction of loans serviced by high experience
servicers in a zip code as of March 2009 (based on our classification). The sample consists of matched zip codes as explained in Section VII.A. The estimates are scaled by
one standard deviation of the High Servicer Share variable and in percentage terms. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel C: Zip Code Outcomes and Ex Ante Exposure: Auto Sale Growth, Non-durable Spending Growth and Consumer Delinquencies
Auto sales
growth

Non-durable
spending growth

Consumer
delinquencies
(All accounts)
(5)
(6)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Propensity Score Controls

0.22
(0.43)
No

0.22
(0.41)
Yes

-0.80
(0.50)
No

-0.85
(0.53)
Yes

-0.23
(4.32)
No

-0.21
(4.44)
Yes

Adj. R-squared

0.000

0.010

0.010

0.020

0.025

0.183

High Servicer Share
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HELOC
Delinquencies
(7)

(8)

-0.18
(1.94)

-0.17
(1.84)

No
0.003

Yes
0.012

Figure 1: Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups -- Kernel Density of Observables
The figure shows the kernel density plots for (a) loan origination FICO credit score, (b) interest rate, and (c) Loan to Value (LTV) in the treatment and control groups defined
using Strategy 1 (owner-occupancy status). The treatment group is represented by the solid line, and the control group is represented by the dashed line.

1(a): FICO credit score

1(b): Interest rate
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1(c): Loan to Value (LTV)

Figure 2: Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups: Evolution of Observables
The figure shows the pre-program evolution of monthly evolution of mean (a) origination FICO credit score, (b) interest rate, (c) Loan to Value (LTV) , and (d) fraction of
current loans that become seriously delinquent for the first time in the treatment and control groups defined using Strategy 1 (owner-occupancy status). The treatment group is
represented by the solid line, and the control group is represented by the dashed line.
800
780
760
740
720
700
680
660
640
620
600
580
560

7.0%
6.8%
6.6%
6.4%
6.2%
6.0%
5.8%
5.6%
5.4%
5.2%
5.0%
Jul‐08 Aug‐08 Sep‐08 Oct‐08 Nov‐08 Dec‐08 Jan‐09 Feb‐09 Mar‐09

Jul‐08 Aug‐08 Sep‐08 Oct‐08 Nov‐08 Dec‐08 Jan‐09 Feb‐09 Mar‐09

2(a): FICO credit score

2(b): Interest rate
2.0%

100%
95%
90%

1.5%

85%
80%

1.0%

75%
70%
65%

0.5%

60%
55%

0.0%

50%

Jul‐08 Aug‐08 Sep‐08 Oct‐08 Nov‐08 Dec‐08 Jan‐09 Feb‐09 Mar‐09

Jul‐08 Aug‐08 Sep‐08 Oct‐08 Nov‐08 Dec‐08 Jan‐09 Feb‐09 Mar‐09

2(c): Loan to Value (LTV)

2(d): Delinquency rate

56

Figure 3: Evolution of Private, HAMP, and Combined (Private and HAMP) Modification Rates
Panel (a) of the figure shows the percentage of loans receiving a trial (dashed line) and permanent (solid line) HAMP modification for the first time in a given month in the
treatment group. Panel (b) shows the percentage of loans receiving a permanent private modification for the first time in a given month in the treatment and control groups
defined using Strategy 1. Panel (c) shows the percentage of loans receiving a combined permanent modification (private and HAMP) in these groups. In Panels (b) and (c)
the treatment group is represented by the solid line, and the control group is represented by the dashed line.
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Figure 4: Alternative Strategy: Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups: Evolution of Observables
The figure shows the monthly evolution of mean (a) origination FICO credit score, (b) interest rate, (c) Loan to Value (LTV) , and (d) fraction of current loans that become
seriously delinquent for the first time in the treatment and control groups defined using Strategy 2 (based on loan amount). The treatment group is represented by the solid line,
and the control group is represented by the dashed line.
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Figure 5: Alternative Strategy; Evolution of Private, HAMP, and Combined (Private and HAMP) Modification Rates
Panel (a) of the figure shows the percentage of loans receiving a trial (dashed line) and permanent (solid line) HAMP modification for the first time in a given month in the
treatment group. Panel (b) shows the percentage of loans receiving a permanent private modification for the first time in a given month in the treatment and control groups
defined using Strategy 2. Panel (c) shows the percentage of loans receiving a combined permanent modification (private and HAMP) in these groups. In Panels (b) and (c)
the treatment group is represented by the solid line, and the control group is represented by the dashed line.
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Figure 6: Quarterly HAMP Modification Rates and Pre-HAMP Private Modification Rates Across Servicers
The figure shows the heterogeneity in modification rates across sixteen servicers in our data. Figure (a) presents quarterly trial and permanent HAMP modification rates by
servicer. These servicer-specific rates are obtained based on servicer fixed effects in column (2) and column (4) of Table 2, Panel B. Figure (b) presents quarterly preHAMP private permanent modification rate by servicer; this rate is obtained based on servicer fixed effects in a regression similar to column (4) of Table 2, Panel B, but
estimated on pre-HAMP data.
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Figure 7: Comparability of High Exposure and Low Exposure Zip Codes formed based on High Experience Servicer Share
The figure shows the evolution of mean (a) origination FICO credit score, (b) interest rate, (c) Loan to Value (LTV) , and (d) fraction of current loans that become seriously
delinquent for the first time in the treatment and control groups in the matched zip code sample in the pre-program period. The high and low exposure groups are defined based
on share of loans handled by high experience servicers in the pre-program period. The high exposure group is represented by the solid line, and the low exposure group is
represented by the dashed line.
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Figure 8: Quarterly HPI Growth, Auto Sales Growth, and Consumer Credit Delinquency Rates in High and Low Exposure Zip Codes
The figure shows the average house price growth rates (Panels (a) and (b)), auto sales growth (Panel (c)), and the delinquency rate on all consumer accounts (Panel (d)) in
the high and low exposure groups in the matched zip code sample. Zip-code-level house price growth is computed using CoreLogic (Panel (a)) and CoreLogic excluding
distressed sales (Panel (b)) price indices, auto sales growth data come from Mian and Sufi (2010) (Panel (c)), and the rate of consumer delinquencies on all accounts is from
Equifax (Panel (d)). The high exposure group is represented by the solid line, and the low exposure group is represented by the dashed line.
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